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Abstract
My thesis is composed by three chapters that study the important role that firms play in
mediating imports and exports between countries, and how their decisions and heterogeneity
can influence the behavior of macroeconomic outcomes. The first chapter, explores the role of
demand uncertainty and learning in explaining the low survival rates and sales of new exporters
using a manufacturing survey for Colombian firms. In the second chapter, using a transaction-
level dataset for Colombian exporters, I document novel facts about the post-entry dynamics
of firm performance and prices in international markets, and study their connection with the
transmission of exchange rate shocks into firm-level prices. To rationalize these facts, I pro-
pose a theory of firm dynamics emphasizing the interaction between demand accumulation and
endogenous export participation. In the third chapter, using a novel administrative dataset for
Canada, I explore the role of trade intermediaries in bringing foreign products into the domes-
tic market and empirically estimate how domestic manufacturing firms are affected by being
exposed to the imports of final and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers.
In Chapter 2, I develop a model featuring Bayesian demand learning and endogenous ex-
port participation in which the learning mechanism is modelled as a signal-extraction problem.
The underlying assumption is that firms are uncertain about their demand in the foreign market
and, for each period they export, they observe a noisy realization of it. These observed signals
determine firms’ posterior beliefs about their demand, on which they base their quantity and
participation decisions. The parameters of the resulting dynamic discrete choice model are
calibrated to match several key moments observed in Colombian firm-level data. This model
is able to reproduce the dynamics of new exporters observed in the data, namely that new ex-
porters sell only a small fraction in the foreign markets, and their survival rates are smaller
than the ones of more experienced firms. Finally, the calibrated model is used to evaluate the
efficiency of policies subsidizing a fraction of the fixed costs associated with exporting. The
results suggest that, in terms of benefit-cost ratios, policies subsidizing exporters with less than
3 years of experience are more effective than the ones targeted to all the exporting firms.
In Chapter 3, I further explore novel features about the dynamics of new exporters, and
study how these dynamics are related to the firm-level response to exchange rate shocks. Using
a transaction-level data for Colombia over the period 2008 to 2018, I document that: 1) export
sales and survival rates are initially small, but then consistently grow in the years following
entry to a new market; 2) prices of exported goods increase with the number of years a firm has
exported to the same destination; 3) the exchange rate pass-through into international prices is
incomplete and new exporters exhibit a pass-through rate that is, on average, 1.8 times higher
than the one of incumbent exporters. To rationalize these empirical facts, I develop a dynamic
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discrete choice model of exporting introducing customer base accumulation due to deep habits.
A key feature of this model is that pricing decisions become dynamic, and exporters have in-
centives to charge low prices upon entry to foster their future demand at the expense of their
current profits. Moreover, this model has important predictions for the variation of the price re-
sponse to exchange rate movements across firms. According to the model, young firms that are
closer to the exit margin transmit a higher fraction of the exchange rate shocks into their prices,
while experienced exporters partially absorb these shocks in order to keep their prices and cus-
tomer base stable. I calibrate this model to match salient features of Colombian exporters, and
in particular to generate new exporter dynamics that are consistent with the data. I then use
the calibrated model to examine, through impulse-response analysis, the aggregate response of
trade volumes to two types of trade shocks: a persistent depreciation of the Colombian peso,
and a trade liberalization episode. The inclusion of deep habits and endogenous entry and exit
has important aggregate implications. First, aggregate volumes are more responsive to tariffs
than to exchange rates. On impact, I estimate an elasticity of trade volumes to tariffs of 1.5
and to exchange rates of 0.5. Second, for both shocks, the customer base accumulation mech-
anism generates a sluggish response of trade volumes, which produces discrepancies between
the short-run and long-run elasticities. Particularly, in response to a permanent tariff reduction,
I estimate a long-run trade elasticity that is 2.6 times higher than the short-run elasticity.
In Chapter 4, by using a unique administrative dataset containing detailed information on
firm performance and import transactions for all Canadian firms, I study the role of wholesalers
as international trade facilitators, and provide evidence on how their import decisions affect the
performance of domestic producers through different margins. Initially, with this dataset, I doc-
ument some features regarding the import behavior of wholesalers. First, I find that the share
of total import value accounted by wholesalers increased from from 26.5% in 2002, to 34.3%
in 2012. Second, I document that wholesalers were the dominant players on the final goods
import markets, accounting for almost 50% of the total import value of final goods in 2012,
up from 43% in 2002. Similarly, they earned notoriety in the import markets of intermediate
inputs by increasing their import share from 16% to almost 22% ten years later. Additionally,
I find substantial differences on how wholesalers and manufacturing firms engage in interna-
tional trade. Specifically, I document that when compared to manufacturing firms, wholesalers
imported more goods and from more countries, and over the observation period the number of
importing firms grew more in the wholesale trade sector relative to the manufacturing sector.
Finally, I explore how domestic producers respond to the increased import competition in the
form of final and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers. To do that, I construct measures
of exposure to these indirect imports at the local market level, and exploit the geographic vari-
ation in this exposure to empirically estimate the effect on sales, employment, productivity and
exit rates of the domestic manufacturing firms located there. The empirical analysis reveals that
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a higher exposure to indirect imports of final goods has a negative effect on domestic firms’
employment and sales and a positive effect on exit probabilities. While a higher exposure to
the imports of intermediate goods made by wholesalers has a positive effect on employment
and sales, and a negative effect on exit rates. Recognizing the potential endogeneity of local
market-level indirect import penetration, I also report the results obtained by specifications that
instrument the indirect import penetration. Instrumental variable estimates confirm most of the
previous results.
Keywords: International trade, exporter dynamics, trade intermediaries.
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Summary for Lay Audience
My thesis is composed by three chapters that study the important role that firms play in
mediating imports and exports between countries, and how their decisions and heterogeneity
can influence the behavior of macroeconomic outcomes.
In the first chapter, using a manufacturing survey for Colombian firms I document two
facts related to the growth dynamics of new exporters. I find that new exporters exhibit low
export sales and low survival rates when compared to their more experienced competitors. To
explain this behavior, I propose a model featuring demand uncertainty, learning and endoge-
nous export participation, that is also used to evaluate the efficiency of policies subsidizing a
fraction of the fixed costs associated with exporting.
In the second chapter, using a transaction-level dataset for Colombian exporters, I docu-
ment novel facts about the post-entry dynamics of firm performance and prices in international
markets, and study their connection with the transmission of exchange rate shocks into firm-
level prices. To rationalize these facts, I propose a theory of firm dynamics emphasizing the
interaction between demand accumulation and endogenous export participation. Then, I study
how introducing realistic firm-level export transitions and grow patterns can shape the aggre-
gate response to external shocks.
In the third chapter, using a novel administrative dataset for Canada, I explore the role
of trade intermediaries in bringing foreign products into the domestic market and empirically
estimate how local manufacturing firms are affected by being exposed to the imports of final
and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers. The empirical analysis reveals that a higher
exposure to indirect imports of final goods has a negative effect on domestic firms’ employment
and sales and a positive effect on exit probabilities. While a higher exposure to the imports of
intermediate goods made by wholesalers has a positive effect on employment and sales, and a
negative effect on exit rates.
v
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With the increasing availability of firm-level customs data there has been a surge in the num-
ber of studies exploring new dimensions of international trade and uncovering previously un-
known features of the trading environment.1 In particular, this research has led to a much
better understanding of the important role that firms play in mediating imports and exports
between countries, and how firm-level decisions and heterogeneity can influence the behav-
ior of macroeconomic outcomes. In recent years, two intriguing phenomena have received a
great deal of attention by international economists. On the one hand, a literature pioneered by
Ruhl and Willis (2017), has documented that the dynamics of new exporters substantially differ
from the ones of more experienced firms and has proposed that the heterogeneity in the growth
dynamics of exporters could be a crucial determinant of the dynamic response of aggregate
variables. On the other, as first documented by Bernard et al. (2010a), it has been observed in
several countries (including Canada) that the amount of trade passing through intermediaries
such as wholesalers has substantially increased, despite the falling trade costs observed in the
last decades. Although an extensive literature has studied the prevalence of intermediaries in
international trade, little is known about the effect of the import competition induced by these
wholesalers on the performance of domestic manufacturing firms.
My thesis is composed by three chapters that aim to shed some light on the underlying
mechanisms behind these two phenomena. The first chapter, explores the role of demand un-
certainty and learning in explaining the low survival rates and sales of new exporters using a
manufacturing survey for Colombian firms. In the second chapter, using a transaction-level
dataset for Colombian exporters, I document novel facts about the post-entry dynamics of firm
performance and prices in international markets, and study their connection with the transmis-
1For a comprehensive review of this literature see Bernard et al. (2007).
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
sion of exchange rate shocks into firm-level prices. To rationalize these facts, I propose a theory
of firm dynamics emphasizing the interaction between endogenous demand accumulation and
export participation. In the third chapter, using a novel administrative dataset for Canada, I
explore the role of trade intermediaries in bringing foreign products into the domestic market
and empirically estimate how local manufacturing firms are affected by being exposed to the
imports of final and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers.
In Chapter 2, I develop a model featuring Bayesian demand learning and endogenous ex-
port participation in which the learning mechanism is modelled as a signal-extraction problem.
The proposed mechanism is motivated by qualitative evidence collected by the World Bank
during the same time period. In a survey conducted among plant managers in Colombia, the
great majority identified lack of experience and information about the export market as impor-
tant non-tariff barriers to entry (World-Bank 1992). I incorporate this insight into the model
by making the assumption that firms are uncertain about their demand in the foreign market
and, for each period they export, they observe a noisy realization of it. These observed signals
determine firms’ posterior beliefs about their demand, on which they base their quantity and
participation decisions.
The parameters of the resulting dynamic discrete choice model are calibrated to match
several key moments observed in Colombian firm-level data. The model is able to reproduce
the dynamics of new exporters observed in the data, namely that new exporters sell only a
small fraction in the foreign markets, and their survival rates are smaller than the ones of more
experienced firms. Moreover, the calibrated model provides an ideal framework to evaluate the
effect of export promotion policies. In particular, I compare the efficiency of policies subsi-
dizing a fraction of the fixed costs associated with exporting with and without age-dependent
criteria. The results suggest that, in terms of benefit-cost ratios, policies allocating resources
towards young exporters (i.e. with less than 3 years of experience) are more effective than the
ones targeted to all the exporting firms. Intuitively, this result could be explained by the the
fact that, due to higher levels of uncertainty, new exporters are more prone to exit when fac-
ing unfavourable shocks in their foreign demand. Therefore, policies concentrating subsidies
among new exporters not only could help them to counteract the demand uncertainty and allow
them to survive, but also can avoid wasting resources in subsidizing mature exporters with high
survival rates.
In Chapter 3, I continue the exploration of novel features about the dynamics of new
exporters, and study how these dynamics are related to the firm-level response to exchange rate
shocks. This chapter provides a complementary analysis of the previous one featuring passive
learning in the sense that firms exogenously accumulate information simply by surviving in
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the export markets. In here, I explore a different learning mechanism in which firm’s current
decisions influence their future profitability. This chapter does not intend to measure which
type of learning dominates, and a formal assessment of the relative contributions is left for
future research.
Using a transaction-level data for Colombia over the period 2008 to 2018, I document
that: 1) export sales and survival rates are initially small, but then consistently grow in the
years following entry to a new market; 2) prices of exported goods increase with the number
of years a firm has exported to the same destination; 3) the exchange rate pass-through into
international prices is incomplete and new exporters exhibit a pass-through rate that is, on av-
erage, 1.8 times higher than the one of incumbent exporters. To rationalize these empirical
facts, I develop a dynamic discrete choice model of exporting introducing customer base ac-
cumulation due to deep habits. The use of this mechanism is motivated by a large literature in
industrial organization and marketing documenting the presence of consumer inertia and state
dependence in the demand.2 Although consumer inertia could be alternatively modelled using
search costs, or imperfect information, the empirical evidence on the dynamics of export prices
and exchange pass-through provided in this chapter supports the inclusion of the deep habits
mechanism. Specifically, one of the key features of this model is that pricing decisions become
dynamic, and thus exporters have incentives to charge low prices upon entry to foster their
future demand at the expense of their current profits, producing export prices that gradually
increase with age. Moreover, this model has important predictions for the variation of the price
response to exchange rate movements across firms. According to the model, young firms that
are closer to the exit margin transmit a higher fraction of the exchange rate shocks into their
prices, while experienced exporters partially absorb these shocks in order to keep their prices
and customer base stable. The parameters of the model are calibrated to match salient features
of Colombian exporters, and in particular to generate new exporter dynamics that are consis-
tent with the data. Overall, the model has a good quantitative fit, and it successfully generates
increasing-with-tenure dynamics of sales, survival rates and prices, as well as incomplete and
heterogeneous exchange rate pass-through over the lifecycle of exporters. I then use the cali-
brated model to examine, through impulse-response analysis, the aggregate response of trade
volumes to two types of trade shocks: a persistent depreciation of the Colombian peso, and a
trade liberalization episode. The inclusion of deep habits and endogenous entry and exit has
important aggregate implications. First, aggregate volumes are more responsive to tariffs than
to exchange rates. On impact, I estimate an elasticity of trade volumes to tariffs of 1.5 and to
exchange rates of 0.5. Second, for both shocks, the customer base accumulation mechanism
generates a sluggish response of trade volumes, which produces discrepancies between the
2See for example Foster et al. (2016) for supporting evidence on the domestic firms and Piveteau (2020) for
exporting firms.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
short-run and long-run elasticities. Particularly, in response to a permanent tariff reduction, I
estimate a long-run trade elasticity that is 2.6 times higher than the short-run elasticity.
In Chapter 4, by using a unique administrative dataset containing detailed information on
firm performance and import transactions for all Canadian firms, I study the role of wholesalers
as international trade facilitators, and provide evidence on how their import decisions affect the
performance of domestic producers through different margins. The empirical specification
employed in this chapter is largely motivated by the extensive literature on import competition,
however it departs from it in three aspects. First, this chapter focuses on the imports carried
by wholesalers, and thus it studies indirect import penetration. Second, it differentiates the
end-use of the imported products, if these are either intermediate or final goods, to study the
dual role played by wholesalers as competitors and suppliers of imported inputs. And third, it
measures import competition at the local market level aiming to capture how the proximity to
potential competitors or suppliers of inputs can affect the outcomes of domestic manufacturing
firms.
Initially, with the dataset, I document some features regarding the import behavior of
wholesalers. First, I find that the share of total import value accounted by wholesalers increased
from from 26.5% in 2002, to 34.3% in 2012. Second, I document that wholesalers were the
dominant players on the final goods import markets, accounting for almost 50% of the total
import value of final goods in 2012, up from 43% in 2002. Similarly, they earned notoriety
in the import markets of intermediate inputs by increasing their import share from 16% to
almost 22% ten years later. Additionally, I find substantial differences on how wholesalers
and manufacturing firms engage in international trade. Specifically, I document that when
compared to manufacturing firms, wholesalers imported more goods and from more countries,
and over the observation period the number of importing firms grew more in the wholesale
trade sector relative to the manufacturing sector. Finally, I explore how domestic producers
respond to the increased import competition in the form of final and intermediate goods carried
by wholesalers. To do that, I construct measures of exposure to these indirect imports at the
local market level, and exploit the geographic variation in this exposure to empirically estimate
the effect on sales, employment, productivity and exit rates of the domestic manufacturing
firms located there. The empirical analysis reveals that a higher exposure to indirect imports of
final goods has a negative effect on domestic firms’ employment and sales and a positive effect
on exit probabilities. While a higher exposure to the imports of intermediate goods made by
wholesalers has a positive effect on employment and sales, and a negative effect on exit rates.
Recognizing the potential endogeneity of local market-level indirect import penetration, I also
report the results obtained by specifications that instrument the indirect import penetration.
Instrumental variable estimates confirm most of the previous results.
Chapter 2
New Exporter Dynamics and Demand
Learning
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in understanding the causes behind
the observed heterogeneity in the performance across exporting firms. In particular, a literature
pioneered by Ruhl and Willis (2017), has documented a series of empirical regularities regard-
ing the growth and survival process of new exporters which have been observed in the data
of several countries.1 Namely, that new exporters start exporting low amounts, exit the inter-
national markets with more frequency and, among the selected group of surviving exporters,
rapid growth rates are observed. Given that many of the surviving firms eventually become
large exporters that account for important shares of aggregate trade volumes, a proper under-
standing of the sources of the heterogeneity in the post-entry dynamics is crucial to explain the
aggregate dynamic response to external shocks and policy intervention.
An initial attempt to rationalize this phenomenon, were the class of models featuring
sunk costs and heterogeneous productivity at the firm-level (henceforth referred as sunk-cost
models). Although it is intuitive to think that the distinct dynamics of new and incumbent
exporters could be attributed to differences in productivity, when contrasted with the data these
models were unable to reproduce the behavior of new exporters. Following the discussion
in Ruhl and Willis (2017), the failure of the sunk-cost models to replicate the new exporter
dynamics lies in the fact that firms, upon entry, face no other barrier to exporting. Thus,
1See for example Ruhl and Willis (2017) for Colombia, Kohn et al. (2016) for Chile, Piveteau (2020), Berman
et al. (2019) for France, and Cebreros (2016) for Mexico.
5
6 Chapter 2. New Exporter Dynamics and Demand Learning
once firms break into the international markets they immediately adjust their export sales to
the optimal level instead of doing it gradually. Additionally, since the selection mechanism
is through the productivity level, only the more productive firms will be the ones exporting
and, therefore, will be the least likely to exit in the following periods. Both features together
imply that, under this model, new exporters start selling too much and exit too little which is a
prediction that is clearly at odds with the data.
In response to that, a recent line of the literature has questioned the supply side explanation
and has hinted at demand dynamics as the main driver of the observed empirical regularities.2
Specifically, it is suggested that new exporters are initially small and exit more frequently be-
cause they are more likely to face informational, reputational, or other frictions that hinder
their ability to grow. Over time and upon accumulating years of experience, much of these
frictions ease allowing some firms to expand and to survive in the export markets. In line with
this literature, in this chapter I study the role of foreign demand uncertainty and the extent to
which informational frictions affect firms differently over their life-cycle. In order to ratio-
nalize the dynamics of new exporters I propose a model featuring Bayesian demand learning
and endogenous export participation. As in Arkolakis et al. (2018), the learning mechanism is
modelled as a signal-extraction problem, in which firms can not observe the underlying param-
eter determining their appealing in the foreign markets.3 Instead, for each period they export,
they can observe a noisy realization of it. It is assumed that at the beginning of each period,
firms have to make production decisions before observing the realization of the signal meaning
that, through a process that entails Bayesian updating, firms have to create beliefs about their
appealing based on the information gathered (signals observed). The parameters of the model
are calibrated to match several key moments observed in Colombian firm-level data. Finally,
I use the calibrated model to analyze the efficiency of export-promotion policies targeting ex-
porting firms. The counterfactual analysis suggests that policies subsidizing a fraction of the
fixed costs of exporting generate increases in the total export revenues that outweigh the total
cost of implementation, however the benefit-cost ratios are non-monotonically increasing in
the subsidy rate. Additionally, I compare the benefit-cost ratios produced by policies subsi-
dizing the fixed costs of the entire population of exporting firms and of young exporters only.
The results indicate that only subsidizing young exporters is more cost-effective as it partially
eliminates the uncertainty that firms face early in their life-cycle and allows high-appealing
firms to be less vulnerable to observing bad shocks.
2See, for example, Arkolakis (2010), Drozd and Nosal (2012), Nguyen (2012), Timoshenko (2015).
3Appealing to be understood as how well it is received or desired the product in the foreign markets.
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2.1.1 Literature Review
This chapter joins the large empirical literature motivated by the theories of export hys-
teresis developed in Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and Dixit (1989). Perhaps one the first
attempts to empirically test this hypothesis is Roberts and Tybout (1997), in that paper the au-
thors proposed a dynamic discrete choice model that separated the role of profit heterogeneity
and sunk entry costs in order to explain the Colombian plants’ exporting status. More recent
examples of dynamic structural estimations include Das et al. (2007), Kasahara and Lapham
(2013) and Aw et al. (2011). Also, the research in this chapter is related to a growing litera-
ture aimed to replicate the observed dynamics for new exporters. In their seminal paper, Ruhl
and Willis (2017) proposed an extended model that introduces a foreign demand function that
deterministically increases with the number of years a plant has been exporting. Additionally,
they include a stochastic entry cost in which, with some probability the plants are exempted
to pay the fixed costs. Although these mechanisms proved to be successful in replicating the
behavior of new exporters, they lack of economic insight. Alternative explanations to endoge-
nously account for these dynamics include financial frictions as in Kohn et al. (2016), market
penetration costs (consumer margin) such as Arkolakis (2010) and Piveteau (2020), and learn-
ing and demand uncertainty as in Arkolakis et al. (2018) and Berman et al. (2019). Specifically,
this chapter applies the learning mechanism used in Arkolakis et al. (2018) to characterize the
export decisions of the firms.4 Among all the competing explanations, the use of learning and
demand uncertainty is partially justified by qualitative evidence recollected by the World-Bank
(1992) during the same time period of the data employed. In there, several hundreds of plant
managers interviewed, indicated that uncertainty about export markets, lack of knowledge and
experience, and underdeveloped financial and transportation sectors were the main determi-
nants of the low export market participation. All these features mentioned are consistent with
the learning and foreign demand uncertainty proposed here.
2.2 Data and Stylized Facts
The data comes from the annual census of manufacturing plants in Colombia, collected by
the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadı́stica (DANE) for the years 1981 to 1991.
This census, that only samples plants with 10 or more employees, contains information about
location, industry, age, capital stocks, expenditure on labor and intermediate inputs, value of
the output sold domestically and abroad, among other topics. This time period and database
have been widely used in the literature, prominent examples are Roberts and Tybout (1997),
Das et al. (2007), Rivers (2013), and Ruhl and Willis (2017).
4The referred paper only focuses on entry/exit to the domestic market and does not consider export decisions.
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I employ the same 19 industries as in Roberts and Tybout (1997), and in order to construct
a balanced panel of firms I apply the same data treatment as in Ruhl and Willis (2017). First of
all, I remove all the firms that entered or exit the market between 1981 and 1991. Then, I drop
all firms whose employment falls bellow 15 employees in any year. Finally, I exclude firms
experiencing annual changes in real production or employment greater that 150% in absolute
value. I end up with a sample containing 1,780 plants with information for the years 1981 to
1991.
2.2.1 Stylized Facts
The main objective of this subsection is to describe a set of stylized facts observed in the
Colombian data, which later are used to inform the theoretical model. The first fact is related
to the export intensity of firms, which can be defined as the ratio of foreign sales to the total
sales. To construct this ratio and to abstract from the effects of composition changes and exit,
the sample is restricted to plants that entered the foreign markets for some year between 1982
to 1986, and continued to export for the following 4 years upon entry. The export ratio is
computed for each year the firm has been exporting (tenure), and then the average export-sales
ratio across firms is calculated.
Figure 2.1: New Exporters Dynamics
Export-Sales Ratio



















Source: Author’s own calculations with data from DANE.
Note: The left panel only contains firms that started exporting between 1982 to 1986, and continue to export for the following 4 years. The
right panel uses all the firms in the sample. Full-sample averages plotted in the dotted lines.
As depicted in the left panel of Figure 2.1, for the firms entering the foreign markets
for the first time, only a small fraction of their total revenues comes from exporting. As firms
gain tenure in the exporting markets, this ratio increases and after 4 years it reaches the average
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export-sales ratio across all firms (dotted line). The second feature documented is the evolution
of the continuation rates, which measure the fraction of firms that having exported for a certain
number of years continue to export in the following period. The right panel in Figure 2.1,
plots the average continuation rates per years of tenure in the export markets for all the firms
present in the sample. The pattern suggest that exporting is an uncertain activity with high
rates of failure among new exporters, however as firms gain experience in this activity the
probability of leaving the foreign markets decreases considerably. Together, these two facts
postulate that tenure in the foreign markets is an important determinant of the firm dynamics
of new exporters.
As a robustness check, I estimate the evolution of export-sales ratios and continuation
rates by estimating the following specification:
y jt = φ+
5∑
a=1
φa1{age jt = a}+γc + ε jt (2.1)
where y jt is either the export-sales ratio or a dummy equal to one if the firm still exporting
the next year and zero otherwise, for firm j in year t. The age or tenure in a market, age jt is
denoted as the number of years that firm j has reported positive export sales. I include cohort
fixed effects (γc) to control for the fact that some firms might enter the market in a better-than-
average year.
Table 2.1: New Exporter Dynamics
Export-sales ratio Continuation rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age =1 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.659*** 0.627***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.028) (0.030)
Age =2 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.767*** 0.764***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.030) (0.030)
Age =3 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.866*** 0.881***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.028) (0.029)
Age =4 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.931*** 0.953***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025)
Age =5 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.868*** 0.891***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.036) (0.037)
Cohort F.E. No Yes No Yes
Note: I report the linear combination of φ+φa for a = 1,2, ...5. Columns (2)
and (4) are estimated using fixed effects at the cohort level. Clustered standard
errors at the industry-level are included in parenthesis.
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The sample used for the regression of export-sales is restricted to firms that continued to
export for the following 4 years upon entry, and the one for continuation rates includes all the
observations. Notice that linear combinations of the intercept, φ, and the age coefficients, φa,
allow to identify the level of the outcome of interest upon entry and its evolution with age in
the export markets. The results depicted in Table 2.3, confirm the same pattern and do not
exhibit substantial differences across the specifications that include cohort fixed effects and the
ones that do not. Based on the set of facts documented, in the following section I construct a
theoretical model that is in line with what is observed in the data.
2.3 Model
In order to capture the observed dynamics of new exporters in the Colombian data, a model
that embeds learning-by-exporting and demand uncertainty is proposed. The main idea behind
the learning mechanism, is that firms instead of observing their true appealing in the export
markets, they only can observe a noisy signal of it every time they decide to export. As firms
continue to export and gain tenure, firms can gather more information and more accurately
updated their beliefs about their unknown parameter. This device coupled with per-period
fixed costs of exporting, can reproduce the two empirical regularities documented.
Discussion: the firm dynamics studied in this chapter, can also be rationalized by alterna-
tive theories relying on different mechanisms such as costly search, financial constraints and
demand accumulation. Disentangling the role of each specific mechanism is, in general, a dif-
ficult task that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the learning mechanism adopted in
this model is justified by the qualitative evidence collected by World-Bank (1992), in a set of
interviews made to hundred of managers of Colombian plants during the same time period. In
there, most of the answers suggested that lack of knowledge and information about the export
markets, is one of the major determinants of the low participation rates.
The model imposes some restrictive assumptions regarding the firm-learning process that
are worth discussing. First, the learning process is restricted to each firm’s export experience
excluding the possibility of learning from the domestic demand, other firms or even hetero-
geneity in the learning rates across firms. In this regard, the tractability of the learning process
adopted is very useful, as many of these extensions can be easily incorporated. In particular,
the signal-extraction process can be modified to make the observed signal about the foreign
demand to depend on the observed signals of the domestic demand, of other firms or to be
dependent of the size of the firms. These an other interesting extensions are left for future
research. Second, it assumes that only producers can learn and thus ignores the role of con-
sumer learning or inertia in the consumption decisions. Possible extensions could be either to
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introduce habit formation or other sources of consumer inertia to the preferences of the con-
sumers, or to explicitly model how exporters search and match with foreign buyers using a
one or two-sided search model. Given that both alternatives require very disaggregated data,
or importer-exporter datasets to calibrate the models these mechanisms are not explored in this
chapter.
2.3.1 Basic Set-up
The world consists of two countries, home and foreign, and an infinite horizon of discrete
time periods t. In each country, consumers spend a fixed share of their income, yt, to consume
varieties of a differentiated good produced locally and abroad. In particular, the preferences
of the representative consumer from the foreign country over the J varieties produced in the











where c∗jt is the quantity of variety j consumed at time t, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties and a jt is the realization of the appealing of variety j in the foreign
markets. The latter is determined every period by a time invariant idiosyncratic component, θ j,
and a shock, εt. Therefore, every period, the appealing shock is given by:












Notice that the process assumed for the appealing shock constitutes a signal extraction
problem, in which the parameter θ j can be interpreted as the true underlying product appeal of
the firm that is unobserved. Instead, every period the firm observes a noisy realization subject
to shocks, εt, that are independent and identically distributed. Analogously, the preferences of
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2.3.2 Consumers
In each country, the representative consumer maximizes her utility by choosing the quan-
tities demanded of varieties of the differentiated good produced in the home country, and taking
the prices and share of income as given. The resulting demand functions faced in each market






















Each of the varieties is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm facing the demand




z j, l jt
)
= z jtl jt (2.4)
where z jt is the firm-level idiosyncratic productivity and l jt the labor demanded. The timing
assumed in this model is the following. Every period each firm has to decide whether to export
or not. If a firm does not export, it chooses the quantity and labor to serve the domestic market,
then profits are realized and the firm moves to the next period. If the firm decides to export,
it has to chose how to allocate the total production between the domestic and foreign markets,
and the labor demand. In particular for the foreign market, it has to make quantity decisions
before observing that period’s realization of the appealing of its variety in the foreign market,
a jt, and pay the corresponding export fixed costs. For simplicity, in what follows I omit the
firm subscript j.
Learning: As discussed in Nguyen (2012), the problem of producing estimates of an un-
known variable based on a series of noisy signals observed over time, is suitable to be modelled
using Bayesian updating. Before observing any signal, the prior beliefs of each firm regard-
ing their underlying product appeal, θ, are normally distributed with mean θ0 and variance σ2θ .
Notice that the true product appeal is firm-specific and corresponds to a draw from the normal
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distribution with mean θ0 and variance σ2θ . Given that for every period that a firm decides to
be an exporter it observes an appealing shock, at, it is useful to define the tenure of firm, and
hence the number of observed signals about θ j, up to t−1:








where the indicator variable xt takes a value of 1 if the firm decides to export in period t
and 0 otherwise. Notice that according to the definition, tenure is measured as the number of
consecutive periods that a firm has exported up to period t− 1. It is assumed that every time
the firm exits the export markets, it automatically gets a new draw of θ. Finally, define āt−1 as







By means of the Bayes’ rule, the firm’s posterior belief about θ, after having observed nt−1















where the pair (āt−1,nt−1) summarizes all the information gathered by the firm at the time
of making their decisions at the beginning of period t. Additionally, it is straightforward









. In order to describe how new information is incorporated into the pos-
terior belief, it is useful to reformulate the Bayesian updating process recursively.5 Denote


















5See the Appendix A for full details.
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from (2.7) it is clear that observing a signal greater than the mean, at > µnt−1 , induces an
upward revision of the mean of the posterior belief in the next period and a downward revision
whenever a signal lower than the mean is observed, at < µnt−1 . Regardless of the direction, the
magnitude of the revision is large for young exporters (with low nt) and decreases as the firms
accumulate years of experience in the export markets. Contrary to µnt−1 , the posterior variance
ν2nt−1 does not depend on the mean of the observed signals and only depends on the firms’ tenure
in the export markets (i.e. the number of signals observed). As described by equation (2.8),
the posterior variance decreases with nt and larger downward revisions are observed for new
exporters.
Firm Optimization
Recall that it is assumed that at the beginning of period t each firm decides whether to ex-
port or not, and if they do, choose the optimal quantities sold in the home and foreign markets.
All of this, without observing the realization of the appealing shock in the foreign market, at,
in period t. Therefore, conditional on their export decision, xt , and with an information set















− xt · fx
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1−σ denote the domestic and foreign market size. After substi-
tuting the inverse demand functions and taking the first order conditions, the optimal quantities























Given that at, conditional on (āt−1,nt−1), is normally distributed with mean µnt−1 and vari-
ance ν2nt−1 +σ
2
ε , the conditional expected value of the belief regarding the appealing shock in
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from the optimal export quantity depicted in equation (2.10) we can infer that firms with higher
beliefs, b (āt−1,nt−1), sell more. As before, we can compute the growth rate of the beliefs about
the appealing shock to understand how new signals are incorporated. Using equations (2.7)
and (2.8), we obtain:



















which suggests that firms that observe a higher-than-expected signal, at > µnt−1 update their
belief upwards, and the opposite is observed for lower-than expected signals. Again, new
exporters will tend to have larger adjustments in their beliefs, and hence in their export sales,
and firms making upward adjustments to their beliefs will tend to be expanding firms with
higher chances of survival.
Moreover, after combining the optimal quantities produced we can obtain an analogue of












1 + ϕ̃−1t bt (āt−1,nt−1)
−σ
(2.13)
where ϕ̃t ≡ ϕ∗t /ϕt. Notice that, consistent with the empirical findings, the export sales ratio
is increasing with the years of tenure in the export markets, as firms incorporate additional
information leading to upward revisions in their belief. Finally, to close the characterization of
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the ex-post total profits:





















σ − (σ−1)bt (āt−1,nt−1)
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− xt · fx
and the expected total profits:







ϕt + xtϕ∗t bt (āt−1,nt−1)
σ
]
− xt · fx
2.3.4 Dynamic Programming Problem
Now, I describe the dynamic export decision in the presence of fixed costs. Notice that
since the elasticity of substitution is exactly the same in the domestic and foreign markets,
the participation decision in each market can be analyzed separately. That is, the tenure in
the domestic market does not provide information regarding the export market nor influence
the export participation decision. Thus, I focus on the part of the expected total profits that











and when firms decide not to export the revenue obtained is equal to zero. To focus on the
effect of demand learning and the endogenous acquisition of information I abstract from any
variation in productivity and normalize the productivity, zt, of all the firms to 1.
Recall that for every period a firm wants to participate in the export markets, it has to incur
on a per-period fixed cost, fx. At the beginning of each period, each firm observes the state
vector (āt−1,nt−1), which conveys all the information required to solve the static and dynamic
maximization problems. Putting all things together, the dynamic programming problem solved






















and the value function of the incumbent exporters:




















From the Bellman equation for new exporters, it is clear that all firms start with the same
belief regarding the unobserved appealing shock, at, and based on that belief they decide
whether to enter to the export markets or remain as non-exporters. Incumbent exporters, on
the other hand, form beliefs about current and future appealing shocks using the information
gathered up to period t, which is summarized by (āt−1,nt−1). In particular, the information set
of firms at the beginning of period t is endogenously accumulated and depends on the history
of export participation. Notice that every time a firm decides to exit the foreign market it will
receive a new draw of θ, meaning that the set of observed signals and the tenure will reset
to zero. The value functions of new and incumbent exporters are solved by means of value
function iteration.
The solution of the incumbent’s dynamic programming problem produces a policy func-
tion of export participation given by:
xt (āt−1,nt−1) =










) ∣∣∣∣āt−1,nt−1]−Vne (θ̄,0)}− fx ≥ 0
0, otherwise.
(2.16)
According to (2.16), the firm compares the expected present value of exporting with the ex-
pected present value of exiting the market. Given that the beliefs and value functions are
monotonically increasing in āt−1, for every nt−1, I can obtain an exit threshold ã (nt−1) which
implies that xt (āt−1,nt−1) = 1 whenever āt−1 > ã (nt−1). The latter considerably simplifies the
characterization of the optimal export participation rule. Notice that since the beliefs, and
hence the profits, of younger exporters are more volatile and subject to larger revisions, these
firms will be more vulnerable to bad appealing shocks and therefore, exporters will tend to exit
more frequently at the beginning of their life-cycle in the foreign markets.
2.4 Calibration
The main objective of the quantitative exercise is to see if the model successfully replicates
the new exporter dynamics observed in the data. To calibrate the parameters of the model I
externally fix some parameters and the rest are chosen to match a set of empirical moments.
To be consistent with the data, one period in the model corresponds to one year. It is worth
noting that this model does not incorporate general equilibrium effects and the domestic wage,
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wt, is normalized to 1. I choose the values of β and σ based on what has been proposed in the
literature. In particular, as is standard for annual data, I assume that the inter temporal discount
rate β is equal to 0.96, which implies an interest rate of 4%. Additionally, I set σ = 5 which is
a common value in the literature, specially for this database.6 Finally, given that the mean of
the distribution of the true appealing cannot be separately identified from the per-period fixed
cost, I set θ0 = 0.
The rest of the parameters ( fx,σθ,σε ,ϕ,ϕ∗) are calibrated internally using a simulated
method-of-moments approach. I choose a total of 7 moments containing information about
the parameters to be identified, these are: 1) the mean of the log-export sales, 2) the average
export-sales ratio in the first 3 years of tenure, and 3) the average continuation rates for the
first 3 years of tenure. Although a rigorous identification argument is not possible given that
the parameters jointly determine the moments, I provide and informal argument of how the
different moments help me to identify each of the parameters. The mean of the log-export
sales is largely affected by the per-period fixed cost, fx and the foreign market size ϕ∗. The
survival rates for the first 3 years of tenure, are informative of the variance of the signals,
σε , as this largely determines how fast exporters incorporate new information and learn their
true appealing parameter. Lastly, as noted in equation 2.12, the average export-sales ratio for
the first 3 years, can be used to identify σθ and the domestic market size ϕ. The calibrated
parameters are depicted in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Per-period Fixed Costs† fx 0.1551
S.D. True Appealing σθ 0.538
S.D. Signal Shock σε 1.087
Relative Foreign Market size‡ ϕ̃ 0.041
Note: This table shows parameters chosen to match the empirical moments.
† Measured as fraction of the average firm exports. The actual value of fx =
1,554.81. ‡ The relative foreign market size is given as the ratio of the foreign
market size ϕ∗ = 12,757.09 and the domestic market size ϕ = 313,726.523
In Table 2.2, I report the per-period fixed costs associated to exporting, fx, measured as a
fraction of the mean export sales. I find that the fixed costs represent 15.51% of the mean export
sales of Colombian exporters. To make them comparable to the to the estimates provided by
Ruhl and Willis (2017), I also compute the fixed costs as a fraction of the median total sales
6See for example Cebreros (2016) and Ruhl and Willis (2017). Using the same database,Rivers (2013) finds
an estimate of the elasticity of substitution of 5.55, so the choice of this parameter seems reasonable
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and as fraction of the mean first-year export sales of new entrants. The values I obtain are
.011 and .257, while Ruhl and Willis (2017) report values of .057 and .219 with a similar
model featuring fixed and sunk costs, heterogeneous productivity and a foreign demand that
exogenously grows with age. Instead of reporting separately the values of ϕ and ϕ∗, in Table
2.2, I depict the relative foreign market size ϕ̃ = ϕ∗/ϕ. I obtain a value of .041, which implies
that Colombian firms face a domestic market that is considerably larger than the foreign market.
With respect to learning process of the foreign demand, I obtain σθ = 0.538, which suggests
a small dispersion in the distribution of the true appealing faced by the firms in the foreign
markets. Finally, the precision of the variance of the signal (νε ≡ 1/σ2ε ) can be interpreted as
the rate at which firms are able to uncover their true appealing (i.e. learning rate). The value
obtained for σε implies a learning rate of 0.846, that indicates that Colombian firms had low
learning rates.
2.4.1 Quantitative Fit
The resulting simulated and data moments are depicted in Table 2.3. The first column
contains the moments obtained using the Colombian firms’ data and the second column shows
the estimated moments implied by simulation of the model. As can be seen the matching, al-
though not perfect, is good enough to capture the main patterns observed in data. In particular,
the model is able to generate increasing with tenure export-sales ratios and continuation rates.
Additionally, I report the average number of years of tenure of exporting firms, although
this is not a targeted moment in the calibration the resulting average in the model is remarkably
close to what is observed in the data. Moreover, in Figure 2.2, I plot the distribution of the
years of tenure in the data and the one implied by the model. As can be noted, the frequency
of the firms with one year of tenure in the export market is disproportionately large in the data
as opposed to the model. However, the model does a good job replicating the frequencies for 2
to 5 years of tenure.
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Table 2.3: Simulated and Data Moments
Moment Data Model
Average log export sales 9.13 9.13
Export-sales ratio, n = 1 0.04 0.04
Export-sales ratio, n = 2 0.05 0.05
Export-sales ratio, n = 3 0.06 0.06
Continuation rates, n = 1 0.66 0.65
Continuation rates, n = 2 0.77 0.75
Continuation rates, n = 3 0.87 0.83
Other Moments
Average Years of Tenure 2.64 2.64
Note: For the data moments, the sample covers a panel of 1,780
firms from 1981 to 1991. The model moments are obtained by
simulating the outcomes of 40,000 firms and taking the cross-
sectional averages. Variable n, denotes years of tenure.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Years of Export Tenure





















Source: Author’s own calculations with data from DANE.
Finally, in Figure 2.3 I compare the new exporter dynamics computed from the data with
the ones produced by the model. Important to notice that export-sales ratio and the continuation
rates for the first three years of tenure, are targeted moments in the calibration. In general, the
calibrated model generates new exporter dynamics that are consistent with the data.
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Figure 2.3: Quantitative Fit
Export-Sales Ratio























Source: Author’s own calculations with data from DANE.
Note: The left panel only contains firms that started exporting between 1982 to 1986, and continue to export for the following 4 years. The
right panel uses all the firms in the sample. Full-sample averages plotted in the dotted lines.
2.5 Counterfactual Exercises
Once armed with the model and the estimated parameters, I am able to analyze how firms
respond to the introduction of policies aiming to incentivize export participation, which consist
of subsidies to the fixed costs associated with exporting ( fx). These policies are commonly
used by governments in order to incentivize existing exporters, as well as to encourage non-
exporting firms to become exporters, and as discussed in Das et al. (2007), they mostly operate
through the entry-exit margin rather than in the volume margin.
To assess the effects of these policies, I use the calibrated model to simulate the firm-level
response to a subsidy to the export fixed costs. I consider two type of policies: one that is
aimed to subsidize a fraction of the fixed costs of all exporting firms, and the second that is
targeted to young exporters with less than 3 years of experience in the export markets. Given
that these policies may have different costs of implementation, to be able to make comparisons,
I compute a benefit-cost ratio by calculating the total change in export revenue induced by the
subsidy and dividing it by the total cost of the subsidy (i.e. the total sum of the fixed costs
subsidized). In Table 2.4, I depict the results for a 15%, 25% and 50% subsidy rate.
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Table 2.4: Export Revenue/Cost Ratios for Different Subsidies
15% 25% 50%
To all firms 9.88 7.76 4.56
To young exporters 10.26 8.82 5.73
Notice that in all the cases considered the export revenue to cost ratios are greater than
1 meaning that, based on this metric, the benefits generated by these policies outweigh the
costs. Interestingly, the policies subsidizing a percentage of the fixed costs of young exporters
produce larger export revenue-cost ratios than policies targeting all the exporters. Intuitively,
this result could be explained by the differences in the levels of uncertainty faced by exporters
during their life cycle. On the one hand, new exporters have less information about their true
appealing in the export markets and as a consequence are more susceptible to exit after ob-
serving unfavourable appealing shocks. On the other, as firms accumulate years of experience
in the export markets they become more certain about their true appeal index and are less
likely to exit when observing occasional bad shocks. Therefore, a policy subsidizing the fixed
costs of new exporters will considerably increase their survival rates, and will allow potential
high-appeal firms to remain in the market leading to a considerable increase in the total export
revenue. Moreover, this policy is cost-effective as it only offers subsidies to a small fraction of
firms.
Another interesting remark, is that the benefit-cost ratios decline as the subsidized fraction
of the fixed costs increases. As the subsidy rate increases, a larger number of firms is able to
continue exporting and thus the total costs of the subsidy increase proportionally. However,
as a result of the decline in the fixed costs induced by the policy the exit threshold, ã (nt−1),
increases and thus more medium and low-appeal firms are able to survive in the international
markets. Given that in the absence of subsidies to the fixed costs many of these firms would
exit the market, their contribution to the growth of the total export revenue, and the total benefit
of the policy, is limited.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a demand learning mechanism into a dynamic model of export
participation. The parameters of the model are calibrated to match a set of empirical moments
computed from the census of manufacturing plants in Colombia for the years 1981 to 1991.
The resulting model successfully generates new exporter dynamics that are consistent to what
is observed in data. These dynamics can be summarized as: small export-sales ratios and
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continuation rates for new exporters compared to more experienced firms, as well as both
variables being increasing in the number of years a firm has been exporting.
The calibrated parameters indicate that, the fixed costs associated to exporting represent
around 15% of the export sales of the median exporting firm, a number that is considerably
lower to what is obtained by models ignoring new exporter dynamics and heavily relying on
sunk-costs. Regarding the parameters associated to the learning process, I find that the learning
rate for the Colombian firms for this time period, is considerably low. These results are in line
with the qualitative evidence collected by World-Bank (1992), in a set of interviews made to
hundred of managers of Colombian plants during the same time period. In there, most of the
answers suggested that lack of knowledge and information about the export markets, is one of
the major determinants of the low participation rates.
Then, using the calibrated model, I evaluate the efficiency of policies subsidizing a fraction
of the fixed costs to all and new exporters. In terms of benefit-cost ratios, policies subsidizing
exporters with less than 3 years of experience are more effective than the ones targeted to all
the exporting firms, given that these policies compensate for the high level of uncertainty faced
by new exporters and avoid wasting resources in subsidizing mature exporters.
Chapter 3
Dynamic Pricing and Exchange Rate
Pass-Through in a Model of New Exporter
Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
Using data for several countries and time periods, an emerging stream of research has
documented that the dynamics of exporters are characterized by a series of empirical regular-
ities (see for example Ruhl and Willis (2017), Eaton et al. (2007), and Berman et al. (2019)).
First, new exporters are smaller than established exporters; and the gap between them gradu-
ally closes as these new entrants accumulate experience in the international markets. Second,
exporting entails a high degree of failure mostly for young exporters and survival rates con-
siderably improve with tenure in the export markets.1 These dynamic facts have prompted the
emergence of several theories that rely on a wide variety of mechanisms such as productivity
shocks, financial constraints, and demand learning. More recent theoretical developments have
stressed the importance of demand dynamics to explain these regularities. In these models,
new firms face a low demand for their products due to some frictions produced by the presence
search and advertisements costs, incomplete information or sticky customer base formation.
As firms gain experience, the frictions hindering their ability to grow ease, and firms are able
to gradually expand into the export markets.
In this chapter, I empirically explore the importance of demand dynamics in explaining the




growth process of new exporters, and put particular focus on the underlying mechanisms gen-
erating these dynamics. Using detailed custom-level data for Colombia containing information
on firms’ export sales, quantities, destinations and ten-digit product codes for the period 2008
to 2018, I document the following stylized facts. First, I confirm that sales and survival rates
increase with age in the international markets.2 Second, I estimate the trajectory of firm-level
prices and find that export prices also increase with age. Overall, these findings indicate that
the observed growth of exporters is mostly explained by increases in the demand shifters, and
that exporters actively influence the demand accumulation process through their pricing deci-
sions. The latter is consistent with an endogenous demand accumulation narrative in which
upon entering a market, exporters initially charge low prices to boost their future demand and
then gradually increase their prices once they have sufficiently expanded their customer base.
I then study the relation between prices and exchange rates and empirically estimate the
responsiveness of international prices to changes in the exchange rate. As noted by Burstein
and Gopinath (2014), this type of study could be informative of the nature of the demand faced
by exporting firms and contribute to our understanding of the presence of real rigidities in the
economy. Formally, I estimate the elasticity of producer prices denominated in Colombian
pesos with respect to the bilateral exchange rate and use this information to infer by the extent
by which Colombian firms change their international prices denominated in foreign currency
in response to bilateral exchange rate shocks (i.e. the exchange rate pass-through). The results
suggest that the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) is less than one, meaning that Colombian
exporters incompletely transmit exchange rate shocks into their international prices. Addition-
ally, I conjecture that the dynamic pricing behavior observed in Colombian exporters can have
important implications for the firm heterogeneity in exchange rate pass-through. Specifically, I
examine differences in the exchange rate pass-through rates over the life cycle of exporters. The
empirical estimations reveal a robust relationship between exchange pass-through and tenure
in the export markets. In particular, new exporters exhibit substantially higher pass-through
rates than incumbent exporters.
To rationalize the empirical findings, I embed a model of customer base accumulation
due to deep habits as in Ravn et al. (2010) into an otherwise standard dynamic discrete choice
model of exporting. A key feature of this model is that pricing decisions of the exporters
become dynamic, and exporters face a tradeoff between invest and harvest motives. On the one
hand, exporters have incentives to lower prices to boost their future demand, at the expense
of current profits. On the other, they have incentives to increase their current prices and fully
exploit the customers they have accumulated. This mechanism generates increasing-with-age
2More precisely, I define as a market a product-destination pair, and for age, I refer to the number of consecu-
tive years a firm has been active in a market.
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dynamics of sales and prices, as observed in the data. With the inclusion of fixed and sunk
costs and additional sources of firm and aggregate uncertainty, the model is well suited to
reproduce the high exit rates of new exporters as these firms start with low levels of profits and
are therefore less likely to cover the continuation costs of exporting. Moreover, this model has
important predictions for the variation of the price response to exchange rate movements across
firms. In particular, young firms that are close to the exit margin are more likely to transmit a
higher fraction of these shocks into their prices, while experienced exporters partially absorb
these shocks in order to keep their prices and customer base stable.
To further explore the mechanisms behind this model, I calibrate the model to match a set
of static and dynamic moments obtained from Colombian exporters. The model correctly pre-
dicts that sales, survival rates, and export price increase with tenure, and it generates incomplete
exchange rate pass-through that is heterogeneous across the exporter’s lifecycle. Then, using
the calibrated model which features realistic firm-level export transitions and grow, I study the
implications on the aggregate trade response to permanent and temporary trade shocks. In re-
sponse to a temporary exchange rate depreciation, the transmission into the prices faced by the
foreign consumers is incomplete. In particular, older exporters that are more important for trade
volumes barely adjust their prices (and hence their quantities), which results in an aggregate
elasticity to changes in the exchange rate below one. When the economy is hit by a perma-
nent decrease of tariffs, the model produces a sluggish response of aggregate trade volumes
that is driven by the firm-level adjustments in the customer base. The gradual adjustment in
the intensive margin coupled with the increase in importance of the extensive margin induces
a discrepancy between the short run and long run trade elasticities, as has been extensively
documented in the literature.
Relation to the Literature
This chapter joins an emerging body of literature on the dynamics of new exporters. In
their seminal paper, Ruhl and Willis (2017) document the different dynamics of new and es-
tablished exporters using data on Colombian manufacturing plants. Additionally, the authors
show that models relying on sunk costs and productivity heterogeneity are unable to gener-
ate increasing-with-age export sales and continuation rates; they propose an extended model
featuring a foreign demand function that increases with the number of years a plant has been ex-
porting and stochastic entry costs. In particular, this chapter contributes to the literature stress-
ing the importance of demand dynamics. Nguyen (2012), Timoshenko (2015) and Berman
et al. (2019) have incorporated demand uncertainty and passive learning to generate exporter
dynamics. In these passive learning models, firms facing an uncertain demand can learn more
about it by simply accumulating experience in the international markets. In a second class
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of models of firm dynamics, referred to as active learning models, firms make decisions that
influence their future profitability. For instance, Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Fitzgerald et al.
(2016) incorporate costly market share formation and marketing and advertisement costs as the
main drivers. Closely related to the research in this chapter are Foster et al. (2016) for domes-
tic firms and Piveteau (2020) for exporters; both develop models in which the customer base
accumulation process depends on past sales. In this chapter, I provide compelling evidence
suggesting that firms adjust their prices to grow in the international markets, which is consis-
tent with a narrative of using prices to foster the accumulation process, and is at odds with the
predictions of models relying on non-pricing investments to accumulate demand.3
Additionally, my work is motivated by the literature studying the relationship between
international prices and exchange rate fluctuations. Several papers have documented the co-
existence of large movements in bilateral exchange rates and import prices that are stable in
the local currency. In a comprehensive study for 23 OECD economies, Campa and Gold-
berg (2005) estimate an average pass-through elasticity of 46%. Using data for 51 countries,
Bussière et al. (2020) report that exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices is
incomplete for most countries, and find substantial differences between advanced economies
and emerging markets. For Colombia specifically, Casas (2020) estimates the ERPT into ex-
port and import prices for manufacturing firms and explores the role of intermediate inputs
to explain the variations across industries. This chapter is close to the literature stressing the
importance of real rigidities to explain the gradual response of prices to exchange rate shocks.
This literature has used underlying mechanisms such as firm heterogeneity ( Berman et al.
2012, Burstein and Gopinath 2014 and Li et al. 2015), import intensity of intermediate inputs
(Amiti et al. 2014), distribution costs (Corsetti and Dedola 2005) and strategic complemen-
tarities (Amiti et al. 2016 and Gopinath et al. 2020). Similar to Jacob and Uusküla (2019),
I use a habit-formation model to explain incomplete exchange rate pass-through into interna-
tional prices. At the core of this mechanism is the effect of the sales smoothing incentive in
which firms find optimal to adjust their profit margins in order to limit the effect on future
demand. This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides empirical ev-
idence suggesting that exporters have a heterogeneous response to exchange rate shocks over
the lifecycle. Second, it extends the analysis of Jacob and Uusküla (2019) by allowing firm
heterogeneity and endogenous entry and exit. With these two features, the model is able to
generate different price responses to exchange rate fluctuations across new and incumbent ex-
porters. In that regard, this chapter is related to papers by Gilchrist et al. (2017) and Hong
(2017), which study in a closed-economy context, the implications of financial distortions and
size differences on the countercyclicality of markups.
3These type of models will predict constant prices over time.
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Finally, this chapter is akin to the literature documenting a discrepancy between the short-
run and long-run aggregate trade responses to external shocks. Using a model featuring plant
heterogeneity, sunk costs and aggregate fluctuations, Ruhl (2008) finds that the discrepancy
between short- and long-run trade elasticity is mainly driven by the differential response of
exporters to temporary and permanent shocks. On the one hand, since temporary shocks affect
the expected future profits of firms very little, few firms change their export status and most
of them respond by making adjustments in the intensive margin. On the other hand, when
the shocks are persistent or even permanent, the expected profits of firms are affected. As a
consequence, some firms are more likely to make adjustments in the extensive margin, which
amplifies the aggregate trade response. Moreover, related literature has studied the transition
dynamics of aggregate trade flows. For instance, Alessandria et al. (2014) employ a micro-
founded general equilibrium model in which the aggregate trade dynamics depend on producer-
level investments to lower their future export variable costs, while Alessandria et al. (2013)
develop a model in which interest rates dampen the response of aggregate exports to shocks. In
both papers, the aggregate response of trade flows is sluggish and takes several periods to fully
reflect the effects of the shock. In this chapter, I use a partial equilibrium model calibrated
to produce realistic firm-level export transitions and growth, which allows me to assess the
response of aggregate trade flows to shocks of different natures.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and
documents a series of stylized facts about the dynamics of exporters and firm-level exchange
rate pass-through. In Section 3.3, I develop a dynamic discrete choice model of exporting that
is consistent with these facts, and in Section 3.4 I discuss the calibration and its quantitative fit.
Lastly, in Section 3.5 I examine the aggregate implications of the model.
3.2 Empirical Findings
In this section, I describe the main features of the Colombian custom-level data used and
provide some facts regarding the main characteristics of exporters, the prevalence of new ex-
porters and their importance for the aggregate export flows. I then study firms’ export dynamics
and further investigate the underlying mechanisms generating them. In particular, I empirically
estimate the post-entry trajectories of export sales, prices and survival rates across Colombian
exporters. Additionally, I explore to what extent these observed dynamics are relevant in ex-
plaining the degree of response of firm-level prices to bilateral exchange rate shocks. Thus,
I estimate the elasticity of producer prices (denominated in foreign currency) with respect to
the bilateral exchange rate, and from this estimate, I infer the exchange pass-through into the
prices faced by foreign consumers. Finally, I examine possible differences in the firm-level
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pass-through over the life cycle of exporters.
3.2.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics
The international data used in this chapter is from the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas
Nacionales (DIAN) and the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadı́stica; it includes
detailed information on the universe of exporters in Colombia. This data contains the firm’s
tax identification number, a 10-digit product code based on the Nandina classification sys-
tem, country of destination, F.O.B. export value (in U.S. dollars and in Colombian pesos), and
quantity (number of units). The data covers the period from 2008 to 2018 and is available on
a monthly basis. Two of the major concerns when working with monthly data are seasonal-
ity and sparsity because very few firms export the same product to the same destination every
month. To alleviate this issue, I aggregate the data at the annual level. Further, to improve the
reliability of the data, several cleaning procedures are adopted. In order to limit the impact
of changes in the classification of the products, I restrict the sample to the product codes that
consistently reported a positive export value during all the quarters between 2008 and 2018.
Also, as is common in the empirical trade literature, I exclude all the products related to the
petroleum industry.4 Similarly, only destination countries with positive export values in all the
quarters are considered, and I exclude all the exports in which the destination is a zona franca
(free trade zone).
First, I document some facts about Colombian exporter’s characteristics. Table 3.1 re-
ports some moments of the distribution of export sales, number of 10-digit coded products,
and number of destinations across Colombian exporters for the year 2014.5 Consistent with
what has been documented in the literature, Colombian data exhibits a substantial skewness
in the distribution of all the variables considered. For instance, firms in the 25th percentile
of the distribution of export value sold approximately $5,000 in 2014, while firms in the 99th
percentile exported around $42 million, the average export value was $2.8 million. Colom-
bian firms exported, on average, 3.7 different products to 2.8 destinations; firms on the 25th
percentile of the distribution exported one product to one destination while firms in the 99th
percentile exported 35 products to 22 different countries.
4Specifically, all products from the 4-digit code 2709-Petroleum Oils And Oils From Bituminous Minerals,
Crude are excluded from the dataset.
5The choice of the year is arbitrary, and the distributions for other years share similar features.
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Table 3.1: Exporter Characteristics
Distribution of Colombian exporters in 2014
Exports (Th. $) Products Countries Product×Country
25th 5 1 1 1
50th 24 1 1 2
75th 186 3 3 6
99th 42,198 35 22 109
mean 2,891 3.699 2.794 8.360
s.d. 43,482 7.217 4.178 27.338
N 7,316 7,316 7,316 7,316
Source: own calculation with data from DANE.
Additionally, I explore the distribution of export spells in the data. An export spell is de-
fined as the number of consecutive years that a firm has exported the same product, to the same
country, or the same country-product pair. Given I cannot determine the year firms already
exporting in 2008 entered the market, I only focus on the observations whose first appearance
in the sample was after 2009. Table 3.2 reports that on average, the export spells last 1.83, 1.60
and 1.70 years at the country, product and country-product level, respectively, and the median
export spell is one year in each of these cases. Contrary to the notion that exporting is a long-
lasting activity, these findings suggest that the bulk of export transactions are characterized by
short duration spells.
Table 3.2: Export Spells Distribution
mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Spells duration (in years)
firm-country 1.83 1 1 1 2 6
firm-product 1.60 1 1 1 2 5
firm-country-product 1.70 1 1 1 2 5
Source: own calculation with data from DANE.
Finally, I study the firm turnover and the importance of new exporters in the different
export destinations. Table 3.3 reports the median value across countries of the entry rate, exit
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rate, and revenue share of new exporters for several years.6 The entry rate is computed as the
fraction of firms selling in a country in year t and that were not exporting in year t− 1. On
average, approximately 42% of the firms active in a country were new exporters. The exit rate,
defined as the fraction of firms that exported in period t and ceased to export in year t +1, is on
average 41%. Both results indicate that firms enter and exit the export markets actively, and the
firm turnover rates are high. Revenue share is computed as the sum of the export value of firms
that are active in a given destination in period t, but that were inactive in period t− 1, divided
by the total export value in a given destination in period t. Reported in Table 3.3 is the median
revenue share across destinations for every year. On average, over all the years considered,
new exporting firms accounted for 9.9% of the total value exported.
Table 3.3: Firm Entry and Exit
2010 2012 2014 2016 Average
Entry Rate 44.2% 40.0% 42.0% 39.6% 42.2%
Exit Rate 45.2% 40.0% 37.5% 37.4% 41.2%
Revenue Share New Exporters 10.3% 08.4% 07.7% 06.6% 09.9%
Source: own calculation with data from DANE.
To sum up, I find that an important share of exporters are new exporters in many countries;
most of them export for a short period of time and eventually stop exporting after a few years.
3.2.2 Stylized Facts
To have a better understanding of the evolution of Colombian exporters, I estimate the
trajectories of export sales, prices, and continuation rates over the exporter’s life-cycle. As
described by Berthou and Vicard (2013) and Bernard et al. (2017), when working with detailed
datasets, the estimated dynamics of new entrants may be subject to an issue known as partial-
year bias. This bias induces an underestimation of the variables of interest during the first years
and is produced by the fact that exporters might enter into a market late in the year. To illustrate
this concept, consider two identical exporters entering the market in the same year, where firm
A entered in January and firm B in December. Suppose that after entry, both firms sell the
same amount every month ($ 100) for the next two years. When exports are aggregated at the
calendar year level, the export value in the entry year for firm A will be $1,200 and for firm B
6I exclude the years 2008 and 2017 because by construction the entry rate is equal to 100% in the former and
the exit rate is also 100% in the latter.
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only $100, and in the subsequent year both firms will report sales for $1,200. Although both
firms behave similarly upon entry, simply comparing the annual export values across calendar
years will give the false impression that firm A is selling much more than firm B in the entry
year.
To correct this bias, I implement the following procedure. For every firm-product-destination
triplet, I identify the year and month of entry into the sample and recompute calendar years
based on 12-month periods after the observed month of entry. For instance, for a firm that
entered a market in June 2009, I aggregate all the observations between June 2009 and May
2010 and consider them as if they had happened in the first year, namely 2009. Similarly, all
the observations between June 2010 and May 2011 are considered to belong to 2010 and so
on. Naturally, I restrict the sample to all the observations whose first appearance in the sample
is after 2008, given that otherwise it is impossible to determine the true year of entry.
For the rest of the empirical analysis, I define a market as a product-destination pair (where
the product is given as the 10-digit Nandina code). Export sales are denominated in U.S.
dollars; to aggregate them at the firm-market-year level, first I deflate the monthly values using
a monthly price index for exporters provided by DANE. Then, the annual value is computed as
the sum of the deflated exports across the reconstructed years. The prices are approximated by
the unit value, namely the deflated export value divided by the number of units shipped. The
yearly value corresponds to the mean unit value across each firm-market-year. Constructing
annual unit values either using the median or the revenue weighted average, produces similar
results.
New Exported Dynamics
Following Piveteau (2020), I estimate the following specification to document the life-
cycle of the continuation rates, log exports and log unit values:
y jpdt = φ+
9∑
a=2
φa1{age jpdt = a}+γdt +γ jpt + ε jpdt (3.1)
where y jpdt is the either the logarithm of the real sales, unit values or a dummy equal to one
if the firm still exporting the next year and zero otherwise, for firm j exporting product p
to country d in year t. The age in a market, age jpdt is denoted as the number of reconstructed
years that firm j has consecutively exported the same product to the same destination. I include
destination-year fixed effects (γdt) to control for any aggregate trends that might affect the
outcome variables, and also firm-product-year fixed effects (γ jpt) to control for any differences
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in productivity across firms. In all the specifications, the reference (excluded) category is
age = 1 therefore the coefficients φa measure the partial effect of age relative to the the level of
the variable of interest upon entry.
Fact 1: Continuation rates are low for new exporters and increase with years of tenure in
the export market.
Figure 3.1 reports the estimated continuation rates for different years of tenure. As is
common in trade data, the survival rates are considerably low and the data exhibits high levels
of attrition. For new exporters, the probability of staying in the same market for an additional
period is roughly 35%. This survival rate increases to 53% for firms that have been exporting
for two consecutive years; it then plateaus around 65% for subsequent years of experience.
These estimates are considerably lower than the ones reported by Ruhl and Willis (2017) for
Colombian manufacturing firms. They report survival rates of 63% and 77% for firms with
one and two years of tenure, respectively. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is the
difference in the level of disaggregation of the data; Ruhl and Willis (2017) use data that is
aggregated at the firm level and I use data at the firm-product-destination level.
These low and increasing survival rates have important implications for the modelling
strategy, and stress the importance of incorporating endogenous entry and exit into the model
to produce realistic transitional dynamics for new exporters.
































Fact 2: New exporters start selling small amounts. Export sales consistently increase with
tenure, mainly during the first years.
Figure 3.2 plots the estimated age-coefficients for the regression on export sales along
34Chapter 3. Dynamic Pricing and ExchangeRate Pass-Through in aModel ofNew ExporterDynamics
with the 95% confidence interval. As can be noted, exports sales consistently grow with tenure,
especially during the first years. On average, the export value of a firm that has exported for
three consecutive years is more than twice that of the export value upon entry. That level almost
triples for firms that have exported for nine straight years. This indicates that although export
sales increase with tenure, the first years are when most of this grow happens.
The first two stylized facts are in line with the patterns documented in the literature. More-
over, in this chapter I show that existing results about exporter dynamics using more aggregate
data, carry over at the firm-product-destination level.




































Fact 3: Export prices, proxied by unit values, also increase with the years of experience
in a market.
Now, I explore the potential mechanisms explaining the observed growth in exports. In
particular, I study whether price adjustments upon entry might be an important source of
growth. As described by Figure 3.3, export prices also increase with age, which is consistent
with predictions made by models featuring customer base accumulation through dynamic ma-
nipulation of prices. In such models, because changes in prices have effects on the trajectory of
future demand, firms have incentives to lower their prices as a way to attract more consumers.
One of the implications of such behavior is that the prices charged by new exporters should be
lower than those of experienced firms. Importantly, these dynamics cannot be easily generated
by models relying on stochastic productivity or passive learning as the main source of hetero-
geneity across firms. In particular, because in these models prices reflect constant markups
over the marginal costs, a constant or decreasing-with-age trend in prices should be observed.
Overall, these findings provide support to the deep-habits mechanism used in the following
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section.





































In the estimated dynamics, I include all observations from the moment they are first ob-
served in the sample until they exit the market. Given that exporters lasting only two years may
be substantially different from those exporting for nine consecutive years, one major concern is
that the estimated evolution of the variables of interest over the lifecycle might be affected by
selection. As a consequence, the inclusion of firms with different lengths of export spells could
produce biased age coefficients that are conditional on the survival of firms in export markets.
To ensure that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of observations with short duration,
I reestimate the dynamics of export sales and prices but I restrict the sample to firms that sur-
vived more than four, six, and eight years, respectively. The results are depicted in Table 3.4,
along with estimations that include all the observations. As can be noted, for the different years
of survival, most of the age coefficients are statistically significant and the increasing trend is
preserved. These alternative specifications confirm the previous results that sales increase with
age, and that exporters use their prices to accumulate demand.
Exchange Rate Pass-through
In this subsection, I study the relation between prices and exchange rates. The latter can
be informative of the nature of the demand faced by exporters, and shed some light on the
frictions shaping the exporter’s response to exchange rate shocks. I start by estimating the
responsiveness of firm-level prices to exchange rates. Influenced by the empirical literature on
exchange rate pass-through, I estimate the first-difference specification given by:
∆ln p jpct = β0 +βe∆ln ect +γc +γ jp + ε jpct (3.2)
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Table 3.4: Estimation results
Export sales Export prices
Products surviving Products surviving
All 4 years 6 years 8 years All 4 years 6 years 8 years
Age = 2 0.700∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0306∗ 0.0367 0.0375
(0.0151) (0.0373) (0.0640) (0.132) (0.00778) (0.0164) (0.0261) (0.0482)
Age = 3 1.164∗∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.108∗
(0.0193) (0.0425) (0.0724) (0.163) (0.00936) (0.0178) (0.0289) (0.0653)
Age = 4 1.566∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 1.621∗∗∗ 2.808∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.0240) (0.0456) (0.0773) (0.182) (0.0109) (0.0191) (0.0316) (0.0764)
Age = 5 1.861∗∗∗ 1.972∗∗∗ 3.545∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.0295) (0.0853) (0.200) (0.0129) (0.0349) (0.0858)
Age = 6 2.167∗∗∗ 2.173∗∗∗ 4.158∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.171∗
(0.0364) (0.0919) (0.219) (0.0153) (0.0369) (0.0947)
Age = 7 2.389∗∗∗ 4.882∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.0442) (0.236) (0.0175) (0.101)
Age = 8 2.813∗∗∗ 5.395∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.0567) (0.255) (0.0232) (0.112)
Age = 9 3.063∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.0817) (0.0349)
Observations 215,864 47,021 28,639 15,959 215,864 47,021 28,639 15,959
Notes: All regressions include firm-product-year plus country-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm-year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
where p jpct is the export price denominated in Colombian pesos, for firm j exporting product
p to country c in year t. The bilateral exchange rate ect is expressed as Colombian pesos (COP)
per unit of country c’s currency, meaning that an increase in ect represents a depreciation of the
Colombian peso. The regressions include fixed effects γc and γ jp to absorb any time-invariant
variation at the country and firm-product level. The coefficient of interest is βe, which measures
the elasticity of the log-change of the destination-c producer-currency price relative to the log
change in the bilateral exchange rate. From it, we can easily compute the ERPT rate as 1− β̂e,
which measures the elasticity of the import price denominated in foreign currency to a change
in the bilateral exchange rate (measured as units of foreign currency per Colombian peso).
Therefore, β̂e = 0 indicates complete pass-through and β̂e > 0 incomplete pass-through.
The results are depicted in Table 3.5; at the top, I report the estimated elasticity of ex-
port prices with respect to the bilateral exchange rate, and at the bottom the implied ERPT
rate into international prices. Similar to evidence for other countries and datasets, the ERPT
is incomplete. The first column contains the results for the whole sample and the estimations
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suggest that a 1% increase in the bilateral exchange rate is associated with a .58% increase in
the international prices denominated in foreign currency. The ERPT rate obtained is within the
range of values reported in the literature. For instance, Bussière et al. (2020) estimates ERPT
for 51 advanced and emerging countries, and in particular for Colombia. In their baseline spec-
ification the authors obtain a ERPT of 0.687 for Colombia, while for manufacturing industries,
Casas (2020) estimates an ERPT rate of .466.
I include a set of robustness tests. First, I address the fact that an important number of
firms export several products to the same destination; therefore, the inclusion of multi-product
exporters might confound adjustments through the intensive margin, with adjustments along
the extensive margin and the product scope. To partially solve this issue, I follow Berman
et al. (2019) and estimate the same regressions for two alternative subsamples. The second
column restricts the sample to each exporter’s major product (i.e. the product representing the
highest revenue share in a destination), and the third column restricts the sample to single-
product firms, that is the ones that exported only one product to a single destination. The
estimated ERPT for the major products is relatively close; however, the estimated ERPT for
single-product firms is lower.
Another major concern in the Colombian data, documented by Gopinath et al. (2020), is
that the vast majority of trade is invoiced in a small number of dominant currencies. The authors
find that approximately 98% of the transactions are invoiced in U.S. dollars, thus estimating
the ERPT using only bilateral exchange rates between the local currency unit (LCU) and the
Colombian peso may omit the fact that the exchange rate with the dollar might be relevant.
Therefore, in columns four to six, I repeat the same estimation with focus on only the firms
exporting to the U.S. Naturally, the estimated degree of pass-through is reduced to .246 and
the estimates for the subsamples of the major products and single-product firms yield closer
estimates.
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Table 3.5: ERPT results
∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP
Major Single Major Single
product product product product
∆eCOP/LCU 0.420∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0264) (0.0584) (0.0671) (0.0739) (0.171)
ERPT 0.580 0.493 0.362 0.246 0.272 0.171
Observations 338,926 108,643 24,133 34,467 11,262 2,096
Destinations ALL ALL ALL USA USA USA
Notes: All regressions include firm-product and country fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm-year
level are depicted in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, I study the relationship between the extent of pass-through and the age of firms in
the export markets. To do this, I estimate specification (4.2) separately for new entrants and in-
cumbent exporters. New entrants are defined as exporters that have been active in a market for
less than 3 years, while incumbents are exporters with three or more years of experience. Al-
ternatively, I estimate a regression that includes the interaction between the bilateral exchange
rate and age in a market given by:
∆ln p jpct = β0 +βe∆ln et +βaage jpct +βea∆ln et ×age jpct +γc +γ jp + ε jpct (3.3)
The variable age jpct measures the number of consecutive years of experience that firm
j has in the market for product p in country c. These estimates exclude from the sample all
the left-censored observations whose first appearance in the sample is during 2008. Results
for all the destinations and the ones focusing on the U.S. are depicted in Table 3.6. Columns
(1) and (4) report the estimates for all the non-censored observations, columns (2) and (5) for
the new entrants, columns (3) and (6) for incumbent exporters and columns (4) and (7) for
the regressions including the interaction term. At the bottom, I compute the implied ERPT,
and for the regressions with interaction, I compute the ERPT evaluated at the mean of the age.
Estimation results when all destinations are included indicate that, on average, new exporters
exhibit a pass-through rate that is almost double that of incumbent exporters. This is confirmed
by the alternative specification, given that the estimate coefficient β̂ea is positive, implying
that an extra year of tenure increases the producer price elasticity in .10 points, which in turn
reduces the amount of pass-through into international prices. Moreover, the ERPT evaluated
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on the average age in the sample yields a similar rate as in the regression that includes all the
non-censored observations (column 1).
For the estimates that only focus on exports to the United States, a similar pattern is
observed. Although smaller pass-through rates are estimated, it remains true that new exporters
exhibit different pass-through rates than incumbents, with the difference almost three times
higher. Additionally, the interaction coefficient is positive and significant, and for every year of
tenure the elasticity of export prices increases .11 points. Therefore, the ERPT decreases with
tenure too.
Table 3.6: ERPT over the lifecycle
∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP ∆pCOP
Age < 3 Age ≥ 3 Age < 3 Age ≥ 3
∆eCOP/LCU 0.622∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.758∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.478∗





ERPT 0.378 0.460 0.257 0.311 0.093 0.242 0.056 0.072
Observations 163,245 56,254 91,142 163,245 17,295 1,028 10,194 17,295
Destinations ALL ALL ALL ALL USA USA USA USA
Notes: All regressions include firm-product and country fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm-year level are
depicted in parentheses. All the left censored observations are excluded.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Fact 4: Exchange rate pass-through is incomplete and new exporters exhibit a higher
pass-through than old exporters.
Overall, these findings suggest a substantial heterogeneity in the response to exchange
rate shocks across firms. In particular, new firms transmit a higher fraction of exchange rate
shocks into international prices, while incumbent firms partially absorb these shocks into their
profit margins. The latter is consistent with the fact that firms in the early stages of their life-
cycle tend to adjust their prices with more frequency. This pattern is in line with the research
focusing on differences in size as the main explanation of ERPT heterogeneity. For instance, Li
et al. (2015) and Berman et al. (2019) find that more productive firms price more to market and
thus have lower ERPT into consumer prices. Given the limitations of my data, I cannot directly
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control for the size or productivity of firms as these papers do; however, I provide compelling
evidence that new entrants are smaller than incumbent exporters, and thus it is plausible to
conclude that the age effect is important to explain heterogeneity in price responses.
3.3 Model
In this section, I adopt the good-specific relative habit model by Ravn et al. (2010) and
embed it into a dynamic discrete choice model of exporting. Motivated by the empirical find-
ings, the model features endogenous entry and exit and demand-side dynamics governing the
exporter’s expansion into international markets. Specifically, the demand for an exporter’s dif-
ferentiated product depends on the realization of a habit shock that increases with the value
of previous exports. I explore the ability of the model to produce the observed dynamics of
sales, survival rates and prices, as well as the heterogeneous exchange rate pass-through over
the life-cycle of exporters.
Discussion: The model employed in this chapter, is motivated by the extensive litera-
ture in industrial organization documenting the existence of inertia and state-dependence in
consumer’s demand. For instance, as extensively discussed in Dubé et al. (2010), it has been
found that consumers become loyal to the products they have purchased in the past, suggesting
the presence of a utility premium from continuously purchasing the same product or, equiva-
lently, psychological cost to switching products. Although state dependence in the demand can
be generated by different mechanisms, in this chapter I adopt a tractable model of deep habits
formation. The choice of this model is supported by the empirical evidence on the dynamics of
prices and exchange rate pass through provided in the previous section. In general, theories that
introduce demand accumulation through non-pricing investments made by firms, are unable to
generate prices that increase with experience.7
Additionally, the analytical framework is closely related to recent developments using
deep habits to study firm dynamics. For instance, Moreira (2016) develops an industry model
of firm dynamics with a similar demand accumulation process to study the procyclicality of
the average size of new entrants. Gilchrist et al. (2017) propose a general equilibrium model in
which firms face financial frictions while setting prices in customer markets to explain the em-
pirical fact that in response to adverse financial or demand shocks, firms with limited internal
liquidity increase their prices while their liquidity-unconstrained counterparts respond by cut-
ting their prices. Hong (2017), using a general equilibrium model with endogenous entry and
exit and deep habits, studies the importance of firm-level price-markup dynamics for business-
7See Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Fitzgerald et al. (2016) for examples of models in which firms make adver-
tising investments to increase their customer base. These models predict that prices are constant.
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cycle fluctuations. Unlike these models, this chapter focuses on how demand dynamics can
explain the post entry growth of new exporters and specifically focuses on how exporters ad-
just their prices to expand their customer base. Moreover, it argues that this dynamic pricing
behavior has important implications for the degree of response of foreign consumer prices to
movements in the bilateral exchange rate. Although the above-mentioned documents share
similar features with my model, none of them focus on the dynamics of exporters nor are they
interested in the type of analysis developed here.
3.3.1 Set-up
Time is discrete and agents in the economy face an infinite horizon. There are two coun-
tries: home and foreign. The home country is populated by a continuum of firms producing
a unique good that can be exported to the foreign country under a monopolistic competitive
environment. The main focus is on decisions made by home exporters regarding their export
status, prices and sales of their exported goods.
3.3.2 Demand
In the foreign country there is a representative consumer demanding goods indexed by
i ∈ Ω, which are produced by exporters located in the home country. The preferences of the










where θ > 0 and σ > 1 (3.4)
where cit is the quantity demanded of good i and bit is the good-specific habit shock that is
assumed to be external and thus taken as given by the consumer. The elasticity of substitution
across varieties isσ, and θ controls the degree of habit formation. It is assumed that the external
habit evolves according to the following law of motion:
bi,t+1 = (1−δ)bi,t +δsit where 0 < δ < 1 (3.5)
where δ ∈ [0,1] governs the depreciation rate of previous habit shock and determines how
sales sit, denominated in foreign currency, converts into habit shocks. As described by (3.5),
the habit formation introduces a word-of-mouth mechanism in which current sales boost the
habit shock faced the next period. One of the major implications of this mechanism is that the
pricing decisions of home exporters become dynamic, and thus they have incentives to lower
their prices upon entry to foster future demand.
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3.3.3 Firm’s Technology and Costs
In the home country, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing
a differentiated good that can be exported to the foreign market. Each firm can produce output






where z∗it denotes the idiosyncratic productivity and l
∗
it the labor employed which is paid the
home wage w∗t . All the variables related to the home country are denoted by an asterisk. The
utility maximization problem solved by the foreign consumer, implies that the producer of






it = pit(1 +τ) +φ (3.7)
where the foreign expenditure allocated to consume home varieties is S t. Notice that I assume
that the price faced by the consumers pcit depends on the producer price (denominated in foreign
currency), the import tariff τ, and an additive markup that can be attributed to distribution or
retailing costs as in Corsetti and Dedola (2005). It is important to mention, that the predictions
of the model hold without the inclusion of φ; however, I use that parameter to effectively control












Let Xit ∈ {0,1} be an indicator for participation. The per-period profits denoted in terms of










)−σbθ(σ−1)it At −Ft − (1−Xi,t−1)S t (3.9)




it) is the marginal cost
expressed in foreign currency using the bilateral exchange rate et. To enter the export markets,
firms must pay a sunk cost S t and then a fixed cost Ft for every period they wish to remain
in the international markets. Notice the underlying assumption that export sales are priced in
foreign currency, a feature known in the literature as local currency pricing.
In this model, firms face two persistent sources of uncertainty: one idiosyncratic and the
other at the aggregate level. I assume that the productivity and the bilateral exchange rate
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3.3.4 Dynamic Programming Problem
Every period, firms make a discrete choice decision about its export status and, condition-
ally on entry, choose the price of their exports. The firm’s state variables are composed by the
individual states (Xi,t−1,bi,t,z∗i,t) and the aggregate state variable et. The value function of the































By choosing to be inactive in one period (Xit = 0), a firm earns zero profits and its habit
shock resets to b0; however, it maintains the possibility of entry into the export market the next
period in case it receives favorable shocks in the future. Importantly, to be allowed to re-enter
in future, the firm will have to pay the entry costs Ft +S t. A more interesting case occurs when
a firm chooses to be active (Xit = 1) because the firm also has to choose the optimal price pit of
its exports. Because of the presence of habit shocks that depend on past sales, exporting firms
face a dynamic trade-off between setting high prices to harvest current profits, or lowering
prices to attract more consumers and invest in its customer base.
To gain more insight into the dynamic incentives faced by exporters, I focus on a simpli-
fied version of the model in which pcit = pit (thus τ = φ = 0) and without re-entry, therefore I
normalize the exit value to zero.8 For this simple model, I derive the Euler equation, which

















and µ̄≡ σσ−1 is the CES markup. Equation 3.11 makes apparent the dynamic
8The resulting continuous-discrete choice problem has been extensively studied in the industrial organization
literature. See Pakes et al. (1991) for a more detailed treatment and derivation of the dynamic control problem.
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nature of the problem solved by the firms. By lowering their markup today, exporters can
influence the habit accumulation process and shift their foreign demand tomorrow. In general,
the optimal markup charged by firms is below the optimal markup charged by a firm solving a
static profit maximization problem (i.e. the CES markup µ̄). Interestingly, the strength of the
incentives to charge low markups depends on the expected continuation decision (E[Xi,t+1]).
That is, the closer the firms are to the exit margin the less incentives they have to accumulate
future demand.9
In addition, the model has strong predictions for the dynamics of exporters. First, given
that exporters start with a habit shock (b0) that is below the steady state value, the export sales
of new exporters upon entry are lower than the ones of incumbent firms. As firms continue
to export, they are able to further accumulate their customer base and gradually increase their
foreign demand. Additionally, the model endogenously produces a negative relationship be-
tween firm growth and age, even conditional on size. In particular, exporters with high levels of
customer base grow at a smaller rate because their habit shock is close to the steady state level,
and therefore, they have less incentive to keep making investments in their customer base.
Second, young exporters have lower markups than incumbent exporters and their markups
converge to the steady state level from below. This is depicted in the right-hand side of equation
3.11. The first term in the square bracket θδpi,t+1ci,t+1σbi,t+1 decreases with age, as the habit shock of
firms that have been exporting for many periods is near the steady state and thus bi,t+1 is closer
to pi,t+1ci,t+1.10 As this term decreases, the gap between µ−1it and µ̄
−1 closes. Finally, survival
rates are initially low given that exporters start with low levels of sales and profits. However,
these rates increase with size and tenure because old and large exporters with high levels of
habit shock are less likely to exit the international markets.
Overall, the predictions of the model are in line with the empirical findings discussed in
the previous section, namely, that export sales, continuation rates and prices increase with age
in the export markets.
Deep Habits and Exchange Rate Pass-through
Now I examine the implications of the model for the degree of pass-through of exchange
rates into international prices. To help visualize what factors affect the degree of firm pass-
through in this model, I consider the special case in which the habit shocks completely depre-
9In fact, firms that are close to the exit margin E[Xi,t+1]→ 0 will tend to charge markups closer to µ̄.
10This can be easily verified by observing the accumulation process of the habit shock described by equation
3.5. In steady state, bss = psscss
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From equation (3.12) it is clear that the bilateral exchange rate directly affects the marginal
costs of the firms and indirectly affects the expected growth rates and markups. Therefore,
when the foreign currency depreciates or the Colombian peso appreciates, the exporting firms
automatically experience an increase in marginal costs. It is evident that in the absence of deep
habits, exporting firms charge myopic markups and thus fully transmit exchange rate move-
ments into their prices. When the habit-formation mechanism is activated, the pass-through
is incomplete, as exporters find it optimal to shrink their profit margins and current sales in
order to limit the decline in future demand triggered by an increase in the marginal costs. Ad-
ditionally, by allowing for endogenous entry and exit decisions, the model is able to generate a
heterogeneous degree of pass-through across new entrants and incumbent exporters, which is
in line with the previously documented empirical findings. In response to an adverse exchange
rate shock, small and young firms that are near the exit margin, will have a lower valuation of
the future expected profits and thus will have more incentive to increase prices in a higher pro-
portion in order to increase their current profits before exiting the market. Alternatively, more
established firms that are far from the entry-exit margin will maintain their incentive to invest
in their customer base, and thus will incompletely transmit these shocks into their international
prices.
The deep-habits mechanism has been previously used in the literature to study incomplete
pass-through. In a seminal paper, Ravn et al. (2010) develop a relative deep-habits model to
provide a theoretical explanation for the observed incomplete pass-through of marginal cost
disturbances to prices. Drozd and Nosal (2010) evaluate the performance of different theoreti-
cal models and their ability to replicate a set of robust stylized facts about international prices.
In particular the authors embed deep habits into a productivity shock-driven international busi-
ness cycle model. One of their results regarding this model deserves careful consideration. In
that paper, the authors find a negative exchange rate pass-through to export prices, a feature that
is at odds with the empirical evidence available. In this chapter I follow a different modelling
and calibration strategy, which could explain why I obtain different results. First, in Drozd
and Nosal (2010), movements in the bilateral exchange rate are endogenously generated by
deviations from the law of one price produced by country specific productivity shocks. There-
fore, this model produces a negative correlation between export prices and exchange rates. In
this chapter, I use a partial equilibrium model in which exchange rate fluctuations arise exoge-
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nously, which coupled with the assumption of local currency pricing resembles the theoretical
analysis of pass-through and firm-specific cost shocks developed in Ravn et al. (2010). Closely
related to this chapter is Jacob and Uusküla (2019), which uses a Neo-Keynesian model with
additive habits and nominal frictions to explain incomplete exchange rate pass-through to inter-
national prices. In that paper, business cycle fluctuations are generated through perturbations
in the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which weakens the negative correlation between
export prices and exchange rates. Second, in Drozd and Nosal (2010), the parameters control-
ling the habit-formation process are calibrated exogenously and set to the values adopted in
Ravn et al. (2010). Therefore, it is not clear whether the habit-formation mechanism is strong
enough to offset the negative correlation between prices and productivity. Instead, I internally
calibrate the deep-habits parameters to match moments related to firm dynamics and exchange
rate pass-through.
3.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match a set of cross-section and dynamic features of Colombian
exporters. To be consistent with the data, one period in the model corresponds to one year. The
set of model parameters can be classified into two groups. The first group, reported in Table 3.7,
includes parameters that are chosen based on the values used in the literature. As is standard
for annual data, I assume that the inter temporal discount rate β is equal to 0.96, which implies
an interest rate of 4%.
Table 3.7: Externally calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Source
β 0.96 Interest rate of 4%
σ 2 Piveteau (2020)
ρe .92 AR(1) regression
σe .78 AR(1) regression
Following Piveteau (2020), I set the elasticity of substitution σ to 2 which implies a CES
markup of 200%. For the parameters that describe the process of the exchange rate, I estimate
an AR(1) process for et using annual data on the real effective exchange rate for Colombia
over the period 1980 to 2018. I find that ρe = 0.92 and σe = 0.78. The value of the nominal
wage at home w∗ and the aggregate demand shifter At are normalized to 1. To generate low
survival rates and high exit rates for experienced firms, the model requires some unproductive
young firms to enter the market. As is standard in the quantitative models of international trade,
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heterogeneous export costs are needed. I extend the model and allow for random export costs
in the simplest way possible. With probability λ, exporters do not have to pay the fixed costs,
and with the complement of the probability firms pay the usual fixed costs of exporting. The
rest of the model, and most of its predictions, remain unchanged.
The rest of the parameters, eight in total, are calibrated internally using a simulated
method-of-moments approach aiming to match a set of moments observed in the Colombian
data. Thus, for a given vector of parameters, I solve the dynamic programming problem given
by (3.10), and obtain the corresponding policy functions of the firms. I then simulate the out-
comes for a panel of 40,000 firms for 110 years, in which the first 10 periods are discarded in
order to reduce the dependance on the initial conditions. The estimated vector of parameters
minimizes the average percentage deviation between the data moments and its model counter-
parts. Table 3.8 presents the calibrated parameters and the targeted moments.
Table 3.8: Internal calibration
Parameter Value Concept
θ 0.382 External habit .
δ 0.536 External habit.
ρz 0.575 Productivity shock.
σz 1.421 Productivity shock.
φ 0.061 Distribution costs.
λ 0.174 Random fixed cost.
S 1.025 Sunk costs.
F 4.484 Continuation costs.
Moment Model Data
Log-growth w.r.t. entry price , age= 2 0.075 0.076
Log-growth w.r.t. entry sales , age= 2 0.693 0.700
Continuation rate new entrants 0.470 0.362
ERPT 0.381 0.378
Entry rate 0.430 0.422
Exit rate 0.424 0.412
Revenue share new entrants 0.093 0.099
Coefficient of variation log export sales 0.957 0.980
Note: To compute the model moments, I simulate 40,000 firms for 110 periods. I repeat the
procedure 100 times and I discard the first 10 periods every time. The average percentage
deviation is 0.059
I choose eight moments to characterize the stationary distribution of the model: 1) the
average entry rate, defined as the average across years of the number of firms that in t−1 were
not exporters and in t became exporters divided by the number of exporters in period t; 2) the
average exit rate, computed as the average across years of the number of firms that in t were
48Chapter 3. Dynamic Pricing and ExchangeRate Pass-Through in aModel ofNew ExporterDynamics
exporters and exited the market in t + 1 divided by the number of exporters in t; 3) The coeffi-
cient of variation of export sales, computed as the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation
of the log export sales; 4) the average revenue share of new entrants; 5) the continuation rates
of new entrants, computed as the fraction of new entrants that continued in the export markets
the following year; 6) the ERPT rate, which is obtained by running regression (4.2) including
firm-level fixed effects. Additionally, I target two moments related to the dynamics of sales and
prices, namely the log growth of sales and prices of firms with two years of tenure with respect
to the entry value. The last two moments correspond to the estimated coefficients φ̂2 obtained
by running a regression similar to (4.1) that includes firm×year fixed effects.
Since the calibrated parameters simultaneously affect each of the targeted moments, the
model does not admit a mapping of each parameter to a unique moment. Instead, I provide a
heuristic argument to help understand the link between the parameters and the data moments
chosen. The serial correlation in the idiosyncratic productivity shocks (ρz) and its standard
deviation (σz) mainly determine the export sales distribution, which can be summarized by the
coefficient of variation of the export sales. The sunk costs (S ) determine the entry rate and
along with the fixed costs (F), the exit rate and continuation rates of new exporters. The habit
parameters (θ,δ) mostly affect the growth rates of exports and prices as well as the revenue
shares of new exporters. Finally, the distribution markup φ is used to control the degree of
exchange pass-through in the economy.
3.4.1 Quantitative Fit
In this subsection, I explore some of the quantitative implications of the calibrated model
and its ability to match the observed dynamics of firm performance and international prices.
For the international prices, export sales and continuation rates, I plot the dynamics for the
data and the model implied by the estimated coefficients φ̂a of regression (4.1). The omitted
category in these regressions is age= 1, thus the coefficients measure the partial effect of tenure
in the export markets with respect to the variable of interest in the first year. In the sales
and prices regressions, the age coefficients φ̂2 were targeted in the calibration, and for the
continuation rate the survival rate upon entry was targeted. As shown in Figure 3.4, the model
is able to replicate an increasing with tenure trajectory of export prices upon entry. Overall, the
model closely matches the dynamics of prices.
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Figure 3.4: Quantitative fit: Export price dynamics
















Figure 3.5 plots the dynamics of export sales, which also increase with age in the export
markets. Of particular interest is that the model correctly predicts higher growth rates in the
first years of tenure, following which the growth rates stabilize. The latter is consistent with
the fact that the dynamic incentives of charging low markups are stronger for new exporters
as opposed to experienced firms. The match with respect to the data is reasonable for the first
years of tenure, and then it slightly diverges. One possible explanation for this divergence
is that the model only incorporates two sources of heterogeneity, namely productivity and
exchange rate movements, while in reality it is expected that additional sources of persistent
heterogeneity across firms and destinations might be at play.
Figure 3.5: Quantitative fit: Export sales dynamics


















The continuation rates are presented in Figure 3.6. Notice that the model, although it does
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not completely match the continuation rates of new entrants, generates low survival rates that
increase with age in the exporting markets.
Figure 3.6: Quantitative fit: Continuation rates


















Additionally, I focus on the implications of the model for the degree of pass-through over
the life cycle of firms. In particular, I estimate the same specification as equation 4.2 separately
for new and incumbent exporters. Consistent with the data, a new exporter is a firm with three
or less years of tenure and an incumbent is a firm with more than three years of tenure. The
estimated ERPT rates are depicted in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: ERPT over the lifecycle
ERPT
Model Data
All firms 0.381 0.378
New exporters 0.616 0.460
Incumbents 0.277 0.257
The model does a good job at matching the degree of pass-through for the whole economy,
which is a targeted moment, but also produces a remarkably close pass-through rate for matured
exporters. Although the model generates heterogeneity in the ERPT rates over the life cycle of
firms, it predicts a much higher rate for new exporters relative to the one observed in the data.
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3.5 Aggregate Implications
In this section, I study how firm-level decisions to maintain a foreign customer base can
determine the aggregate trade response to external shocks. In particular, I analyze the response
of aggregate trade volumes to a one-time and a persistent depreciation of the Colombian peso,
and to a trade liberalization episode. To assess the effect of these shocks on the aggregate, I
perform the following Impulse Response analysis. I simulate 1,000 economies, with 40,000
firms for T periods. In the baseline scenario, there are no shocks. In the counterfactual scenario,
at time t̃ < T , I impose either a one-time depreciation, a persistent depreciation or a permanent
elimination of the trade tariff. Then, for every year, I aggregate the trade volumes by summing
across the firm-level exports. I report the average over the 1,000 economies of the log-deviation
of the aggregate volumes with shock relative to the baseline scenario.
3.5.1 Exchange Rate Shocks
One-time Depreciation
First, I analyze the aggregate trade response to one-time unanticipated depreciation of the
Colombian peso. That is, in period t̃ the bilateral exchange rate measured in Colombian pesos
per foreign currency increases the equivalent to one standard deviation, and after period t̃ the
shock completely disappears. The IRF of the aggregate trade volumes along with the evolution
of the bilateral exchange rate are depicted in Figure 3.7. As a consequence of the presence of
deep habits in the model, on impact, the exchange rate depreciation is not completely transmit-
ted into the aggregate trade volumes, although its effects are visible a few years after the shock.
The elasticity of trade volumes with respect to a one-time depreciation of the Colombian peso
is close to 0.57. Given the nature of the shock considered, most of the firm-level response is
through the intensive margin rather than through the extensive margin.
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Figure 3.7: One-time depreciation exchange rate
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How different is the aggregate trade response when the economy is hit by persistent ex-
change rate shock? When exporters face a persistent depreciation, they perceive the exchange
rate as remaining favorable for many periods. Therefore, they incorporate this information into
their expectations and a more pronounced aggregate response is expected.
In Figure 3.8, I introduce a persistent depreciation of the Colombian peso. As in the
previous experiment in period t̃, I increase the bilateral exchange rate in one standard deviation
but allow the exchange rate to evolve according to the Markov process assumed. On impact,
the aggregate volume’s elasticity is slightly higher than that of the purely temporary exchange
rate shock. However, there are important qualitative differences in the periods after the shock.
When the depreciation is persistent, the effect on aggregate volume builds up and reaches
its peak after 4 years, then gradually decays over time. The latter indicates that persistent
movements in the exchange rate not only trigger investing motives in the customer base, but
also induce a larger role for adjustments through the extensive margin. As a consequence, since
firm-level entry also responds to the shock, the effect on aggregate volumes is amplified and a
different response on impact and on the periods after the shock is observed.
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Figure 3.8: Persistent depreciation exchange rate
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3.5.2 Permanent Tariff Decrease
Finally, I study the aggregate response to a permanent trade liberalization episode. As be-
fore, I simulate the firm-level response to the elimination of the 13% import tariff and compare
it to a counterfactual scenario without tariff decrease. In the upper panel, Figure 3.9 reports the
log-deviation of the aggregate trade volume in response to the tariff reduction; the bottom panel
illustrates the implied trade elasticity.11 The model generates a slow adjustment to trade. In the
first year, the trade elasticity is almost 1.5, which is below the elasticity of substitution (σ = 2).
This short-run elasticity is smaller than σ because building a customer base is a lengthy process
that involves a high risk of failure and thus, exporters do not immediately respond to the shock.
Regardless of that, given the permanent nature of a tariff reduction, the trade elasticity is above
one even in the short run, which contrasts with the findings for the exchange rate movements
in which the short-run elasticity was below one; this reinforces the idea that trade volumes are
much more responsive to tariffs than they are to real exchange rates.
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Figure 3.9: Trade liberalization
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In the years following the trade liberalization episode, this initial response is amplified by
the gradual accumulation of customer base. It takes almost 5 years for the effect of the tariff
elimination to be fully reflected in the aggregate trade flows. The trade elasticity increases
from 1.5 to almost 4 in the long-run. This discrepancy between trade elasticities at different
horizons has been extensively documented in the literature and the estimated values are in
line with what has been obtained in empirical studies. For instance, using data for Ireland
and a regression strategy considering post-entry export dynamics, Fitzgerald and Haller (2018)
estimate aggregate trade elasticities to tariff changes to be between 1.5 and 3.5 on impact, and
between 2 and 5 in the long run.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the dynamics of new exporters and the implications on the firm-
level response to trade shocks. Using detailed custom level data for Colombia over the period
2008 to 2018, I find that continuation rates, exports, and prices increase with the years of tenure
in the international markets. These findings indicate that an important fraction of the observed
growth of new exporters may be explained by the fact that these firms use price adjustments
to expand into international markets. Additionally, I explore how these post-entry dynamics
are related to the firm-level response to trade shocks such as exchange rate movements. By
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estimating a series of exchange rate pass-through regressions, I find that the pass-through is in-
complete and heterogeneous over the life cycle of exporters. In particular, I find that exchange
rate pass-through of new exporters, is consistently higher than that of incumbent exporters.
To interpret these findings, I construct a quantitative model of exporting, featuring cus-
tomer base accumulation and endogenous entry and exit into the international markets. In
this model, the introduction of deep-habits mechanisms implies that new exporters start small
and therefore face high exit rates upon entry. As these firms survive, they have dynamic in-
centives to use markup adjustments to construct their customer base. As a consequence, the
prices of new exporters tend to be lower and adjusted with more frequency than the ones of
incumbent exporters. Also, the model has further implications for the degree of response to
exchange rate shocks. Given the tension between maximizing current profits and the present
value of future profits introduced by the deep-habits mechanism, when exporters are affected
by unfavorable exchange rate shocks (i.e. an appreciation of their own currency), they partially
increase their prices. However, a different response is observed between new and incumbent
exporters. Specifically, new exporters pass through a higher portion of the shock into their
prices because these firms face higher exit probabilities than incumbent exporters and thus put
more weight on maximizing current profits and less on long-term profits.
Then, I calibrate this model to match salient features of Colombian exporters, and in par-
ticular to generate new exporter dynamics that are consistent with the data. I use the calibrated
model to examine, through impulse-response analysis, the aggregate response of trade volumes
to different types of trade shocks: a one-time depreciation of the Colombian peso, a persistent
depreciation, and a trade liberalization episode. The inclusion of deep habits and endogenous
entry and exit has important aggregate implications. First, aggregate volume elasticities are
more responsive to tariffs than to exchange rates. On impact, I estimate an elasticity of trade
volumes to tariffs of 1.5 and to exchange rates of .5. Second, when the shocks are either per-
sistent or permanent, the customer base accumulation model generates a sluggish response of
trade volumes, which produces discrepancies between the short-run and long-run elasticities.
Particularly, in response to a permanent tariff reduction, I estimate a long-run trade elasticity
that is 2.6 times higher than the short-run elasticity.
This quantitative framework sheds some light on the mechanisms behind the new exporter
dynamics and ERPT heterogeneity across exporters. Nonetheless, the framework is silent about
the general equilibrium effects that export entry and expansion may have on the prices of goods
or interest rates. For instance, Jacob and Uusküla (2019) examine how monetary policy and
nominal exchange rate fluctuations influence the effective discount rate used by firms to evalu-
ate expected profits from international sales.
Chapter 4
Import Wholesalers and the Effect of
Trade on Canadian Producers
4.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, a substantial increase in the number of free trade agreements
between countries coupled with major technological advances in transportation and telecom-
munications has shifted international trade towards a frictionless state. Intuitively, following
a reduction in both variable and fixed trade costs an increase in the amount of direct trade be-
tween producers in one country and final consumers in another should be expected, as well as
a decrease in the share of trade passing through intermediaries such as wholesalers.1 However,
empirical evidence seems to point in the opposite direction. Using a unique administrative
dataset for Canada for the period 2002 to 2012, I document that Canadian wholesalers have
played a prominent role in international trade, and their importance in aggregate trade flows
has increased over the last years. Specifically, I observe that the share of total import value ac-
counted for firms in the wholesale trade sector, increased from 26% in 2002 to 34% in 2012.2
Additionally, with this novel dataset of Canadian firms, I explore some features related to the
type of goods in which wholesalers specialize in, as well as how they differ from manufacturing
firms along several dimensions. First, I document that between 2002 to 2012 wholesalers were
the dominant players in the import markets of final goods and considerably increased their
presence in the intermediate goods import market. In 2002, wholesale trade firms accounted
1Theoretical models featuring trade intermediaries such as Ahn et al. (2011), Crozet et al. (2013) and Akerman
(2017), predict a positive relationship between fixed and variable trade costs and the benefits of intermediation.
2Using data at the establishment level yields a more dramatic increase, as the share of total import value




for 43% and 16% of the total import value of final and intermediate goods, respectively. And by
the end of the period, those shares increased to 49% and 22%. Then I find that, when compared
to manufacturing firms, wholesalers imported more products and from more countries. On av-
erage, wholesalers imported 28.6 products from 4.5 different countries, while manufacturing
firms imported 22.3 products from 3.9 countries. Moreover, I observe that over the sample
period the average number of products, number of countries and number of importing firms
increased more in the wholesale trade sector than in the manufacturing one.
Although an extensive literature has studied the firm and industry-level response to higher
import competition, less well understood is the role played by wholesalers in making these
imports available in the domestic market. Given that wholesalers carry a substantial amount of
trade and control large distribution networks, their decisions of where to locate, what products
to import and from which countries, can determine how the effects of trade spread to domestic
consumers and producers. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge that the imports of
wholesalers would have a differential effect on manufacturing firms depending on their location
in the supply chain. On the one hand, wholesalers importing final goods not only would expand
the number of goods available for consumption, but also would expose domestic producers to
more competition. On the other, wholesalers selling intermediate goods to local producers
would allow them to have access to imported inputs even if they do not engage directly in trade
themselves.
In particular, this chapter aims to identify the multiple margins along which manufactur-
ing firms adjust in response to the increasing import competition induced by wholesalers, in the
form of final and intermediate goods. For that purpose, I use the Statistics Canada’s National
Accounts Longitudinal Microdata File (NALMF). This unique dataset contains comprehensive
information on the performance and characteristics of nearly all Canadian firms over time, and
is augmented with detailed information on import transactions. To explore how domestic pro-
ducers are affected by being exposed to the imports of intermediate and final goods made by
wholesalers, I construct measures of indirect import penetration at the local market level.3 I
treat these local markets as subeconomies subject to different type of shocks and with differ-
ent levels of exposure to indirect import competition as the result of the regional variation in
the number and importance of wholesalers and manufacturing firms. By exploiting the geo-
graphic variation in the exposure to these imports, I empirically estimate its effect on sales,
employment, productivity and survival of the domestic manufacturing firms operating in the
same local market. The empirical analysis reveals a negative correlation between the exposure
to indirect imports of final goods and domestic firms’ labor, sales, productivity and survival.
3Formally, the indirect import penetration is measured as the ratio of the imports made by wholesalers to the
total imports plus domestic manufacturing sales.
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While a higher exposure to indirect imports of intermediate goods is positively correlated with
the same set of variables. To identify the causal effect of the increasing imports made by whole-
salers, I follow an instrumental variable approach to account for the potential endogeneity of
the measures of domestic exposure to indirect imports. In particular, I instrument the indirect
import penetration of final and intermediate goods with the average of the indirect import pen-
etration in the local markets located outside an inner radius but within an outer radius. These
instruments are aimed to remove all the variation associated with local market conditions and
local policies, and at the same time maintain the variation attributed to the effects of being
close to the imports of final and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers. The instrumental
variable estimates confirm the negative effect of indirect imports of final goods on employment,
sales and survival, as well as the positive effect of indirect imports of intermediate goods on
employments and sales. However, no causal effect of indirect imports of intermediate goods
on the survival of manufacturing firms is observed.
4.2 Literature Review
This chapter is mostly related to two streams of the literature. First, it is close to the
research on the effects of trade on firm performance. An extensive empirical literature has
examined the effects of import competition, mainly from low-income countries, on the real-
location of manufacturing within and across industries. By constructing measures of import
penetration, some studies have found that higher import exposure is related to lower manu-
facturing employment and earnings (Autor et al. 2014, Acemoglu et al. 2016 and Kamal and
Lovely 2017), reallocations towards capital-intensive activities and changes in the product mix
(Bernard et al. 2006) and upgrades in product quality (Khandelwal 2010). Further work has
used quantitative models to study how higher import competition can increase average pro-
ductivity and reduce markup distortions (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008; Edmond et al. 2015),
as well as to induce within-firm reallocations towards the most efficient products (Eckel and
Neary 2010). Additionally, a recent literature on offshoring has estimated that input trade
increases average productivity (Kasahara and Rodrigue 2008; Halpern et al. 2015), reduces
prices (Blaum et al. 2016) and expands the product scope of manufacturing firms (Goldberg
et al. 2010). Akin to this literature, this chapter studies how higher import competition can
induce reallocations within and across manufacturing firms, and contributes to the literature by
focusing on the role of intermediated imports of final and intermediate goods in inducing such
reallocations.
Second, this chapter belongs to the literature on trade intermediaries. A well established
theoretical literature on trade intermediation has studied the role of intermediaries in reducing
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the search and matching costs needed to connect buyers and sellers (Rubinstein and Wolinsky
1987, Antras and Costinot 2011 and Blum et al. 2012 ), and has developed models to character-
ize the process through which intermediaries create and maintain their supply network and rent
it to other firms with information shortages (Rauch and Watson 2004, Petropoulou 2011 and
Chaney 2014). More recently, Ganapati (2017) structurally estimates a model with downstream
demand and entry/exit in the wholesale markets, and finds that despite the increase in market
power obtained by wholesalers the benefits provided to downstream buyers offset the costs. On
the empirical side of the literature, which is surveyed by Blum et al. (2017), numerous studies
have documented the importance of intermediaries in international trade and aggregate trade
flows. For instance, Bernard et al. (2010b) report that import intermediaries represented 56%
of the total number of importing firms and accounted for 24% of the import shipments for the
US in 2002, while Blum et al. (2010) find that between 2002 to 2008, Chilean wholesalers
accounted, on average, for 45% of the total import value. On the export side, Bernard et al.
(2010b) document that wholesalers accounted for 47% of the exporting firms and 11% of the
export value in the US, and for Italy Bernard et al. (2015) find that wholesalers constituted 27%
of the number of exporters and 10% of the export value. Moreover, the literature on import
wholesalers has explored several other features about their involvement in international trade,
as well as the similarities and differences with importing manufacturing firms. The available
evidence indicates that wholesalers tend to import and export more products than manufac-
turing firms (Blum et al. 2017 and Utar 2017), that wholesalers have a larger share of trade
with smaller countries (Bernard et al. 2010b), and tend to have small and young international
trading partners (Bernard et al. 2015 and Blum et al. 2012). Related to this chapter is Utar
(2017), that uses a dataset for Denmark to document a series of stylized facts about export and
import wholesalers. In particular, the author finds that the characteristics of wholesale trade
firms in international trade differ depending on whether they trade final or intermediate goods.
In intermediate goods, export wholesalers have higher unit prices than the ones of manufac-
turing firms, while the opposite holds true for final goods exports. This chapter contributes to
this literature by focusing on how the imports of wholesalers affect domestic manufacturing
firms. And specifically, it argues that imports of intermediate and final goods would have a
differential effect on these local producers.
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows. Section 3 describes the data and methods
and documents a set of stylized facts regarding importing wholesalers. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. And Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
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4.3 Data
This chapter employs the National Accounts Longitudinal Microdata File (NALMF),
which is a comprehensive dataset compiled by Statistics Canada using several administrative
datasets: the Business Register (BR), T2 Corporate Income Tax (T2), the General Index of
Financial Information (GIFI), the Statements of Remuneration Paid (T4) and the Payroll De-
ductions and Remittances (PD7). The resulting longitudinal database contains annual informa-
tion on sales, production costs, employment, capital, the economic region (ECR) and statistical
area of location of nearly all Canadian firms over the period 2002 to 2012.4 Additionally,
the NALMF dataset assigns to each firm a unique 6-digit industry code based on the North
American Industry Classification (NAICS). In this chapter, I restrict my attention to firms be-
longing to the manufacturing (2-digit NAICS codes 31, 32 and 33) and wholesale trade (2-digit
NAICS code 41) sectors. On top of that, this dataset is matched with custom transaction-level
data including information on the unique identifier of the Canadian-based firm engaging in the
transaction, the 10-digit product code (according to the Harmonized System), the import value
(in Canadian dollars) and the country of origin.
I further augment this dataset in two directions. First, I classify imports according to their
end-use as final or intermediate goods. To make such distinction, I employ the correspondence
tables between the HS and Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, which allows me
to differentiate between capital, intermediate or final goods. Second, in order to determine the
most likely industry of destination of the imported goods by wholesalers, I use the concor-
dances tables between NAICS and the HS provided by Pierce and Schott (2012), which assign
a unique 5-digit NAICS industry to each 6-digit HS product code.5 Overall, the resulting
dataset is particularly well suited for my analysis because it allows me to identify which firms
are wholesalers, whether they import intermediate or final goods, and also which manufactur-
ing industry is the most likely destination of those goods. Moreover, since I can observe the
geographic location of both wholesalers and manufacturing firms I can construct local market
measures of how exposed are manufacturers to the imports carried by wholesalers.
In the following subsections, I use the constructed dataset to document some empirical
regularities describing the importance of wholesalers in total import values, as well as in the
intermediate and final good markets. And then show how wholesalers compare to manufac-
turing firms engaging in international trade along several dimensions. Additionally, I discuss
in detail how the measures of import exposure are constructed, as well as the manufacturing
4Specifically, the NALMF contains the economic region and statistical area where the headquarters of the
firms are located.
5Around 90% of the 6-digit HS codes are assigned to a unique NAICS industry, whenever a HS code is
assigned to more than one industry I use the mode.
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firm-level variables used in the rest of the chapter.
4.3.1 The Surge of Canadian Wholesalers
In the early 2000s, Canadian wholesalers experienced a substantial expansion. In 2004,
wholesalers reported sales worth $450 billion dollars, which represented a 42% increase in
revenues between 1997 and 2004.6 Over the same time period the output by wholesalers, mea-
sured by their contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), grew on average at 7.1% per year
which considerably outperformed the annual growth of 4.2% of the economy as a whole. As
a result, in 2004 wholesale trade positioned as the third most important sector in the Cana-
dian economy, up from the fifth place in 1997.7 Although, basically all the subsectors within
the wholesale trade sector expanded between 1997 and 2004, most of the grow in revenues
was driven by substantial increases in the personal and household goods, automotive products,
building materials and supplies, food beverage and tobacco products and machinery, equip-
ment and supplies subsectors. In particular, wholesale sales of personal goods and household
goods rose by 75% during the same period, and most of this growth was accounted by the
wholesaling of pharmaceuticals, which increased almost 185%.
At the same time, Canadian wholesalers sourced an important fraction of their products
internationally and benefited from being the primary buyers and distributors of these imported
products. As suggested by Hays (2009), on average, 35.2% of the total purchases of whole-
salers between 1998 and 2001 were imported. Interestingly, the imports of wholesalers were
not only concentrated on final goods sold to retailers and consumers, but also incorporated
intermediate goods and supplies directed to other firms in different sectors. An illustrative ex-
ample of this dual role of wholesalers is provided by Hays (2009) for the textile and clothing
industry. The author documents that although approximately 50% of apparel wholesale sales
were directed towards retailers, between 1997 and 2004, sales to retailers rose only by 5%.
While wholesale sales to industrial, commercial and other business rose by 33%. The latter
describes how wholesalers are important suppliers of finished apparel, and also of textiles to
the Canadian industrial segment.
4.3.2 Wholesalers and Manufacturers in International Trade
I begin the exploration of the role of wholesalers by detailing a set of facts describing their
involvement in international trade, and by making comparisons with another important trading
6All money figures are in constant dollars.
7See Hays (2009) for a detailed study of the expansion of Canadian wholesalers between 1997 and 2004.
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agent: manufacturers. Using the NALMF and the import transaction data, initially, I explore
the importance of wholesalers and manufacturing firms in aggregate import flows and study its
evolution over time. For each year, I compute the import shares across these two sectors as
the sum of the import value of firms classified as manufacturers or wholesalers, divided by the
total import value.8
As can be noted in Figure 4.1, the share of total import value carried by manufacturing
dramatically fell from 60.4% in 2002 to 38.5% at the end of the period. An important fraction
of this decline was picked-up by wholesalers, who observed an increase in the share of the total
import value from 26.5% in 2002, to 34.3% in 2012.
Figure 4.1: Import shares by sector





























Source: Own calculation with data from NALMF and import transactions.
Then I focus on the presence of wholesalers and manufacturers in the import markets of
intermediate and final goods. Similarly, I sum the import value of goods classified as interme-
diate or final goods across sectors, and divide it by the total import value of the goods classified
as final or intermediate goods. Figure 4.2 plots the evolution of the import shares by end-use
across the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors.9 Notice that in the international market
for intermediate goods, manufacturing firms were the dominant players but their importance
considerably declined over the period of observation. In 2002, imports of manufacturing firms
accounted for almost 75% of the imports of intermediate goods in Canada, and by 2012 that
share dropped to 50%. On the contrary, Canadian wholesalers increased their presence in the
market for imported inputs and positioned as important distributors of these type of goods.
As depicted by the graph the share of the import value of intermediate goods accounted by
8The values used in the graph are contained in Table C1 in the Appendix C
9The actual values are contained in Table C2 in the Appendix C.
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wholesalers increased from 16% to almost 22% by the end of the period.
Figure 4.2: Import shares by sector and end-use
Intermediate goods

























































Source: Own calculation with data from NALMF and import transactions.
For the final goods market, firms in the wholesale trade sector were responsible for the
bulk of the imports. In 2012, wholesalers carried almost 42% of Canada’s total imports of
final goods and that share gradually increased up to almost 50% ten years later. While the
manufacturing sector observed a rapid decline in their share of import value over the 2002 and
2012 period, from 33% to less than 20%.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Canadian Importers
Year Manufacturing Wholesale Trade
Mean Median # Firms Mean Median # Firms
HS10 Products
2002 21.14435 6 21060 24.67557 8 24397
2003 20.9215 5 20739 24.81357 8 24395
2004 22.34627 6 21804 27.69973 9 25134
2005 23.01065 7 24970 28.71928 9 27315
2006 22.60658 7 24953 28.01151 9 30411
2007 22.36395 6 25344 28.38415 9 31287
2008 22.54145 7 24835 28.69682 9 30747
2009 22.1228 6 23657 29.44549 9 29763
2010 22.30649 7 23371 29.92951 9 29224
2011 23.16751 7 23073 31.52312 10 28888
2012 22.95155 7 23056 31.83958 10 28575
Total 22.34708 6 256862 28.63829 9 310136
Countries
2002 3.477303 2 21060 3.875927 2 24397
2003 3.536718 2 20739 3.955237 2 24395
2004 3.78747 2 21804 4.334845 2 25134
2005 3.973648 2 24970 4.525096 2 27315
2006 3.977077 2 24953 4.474598 2 30411
2007 3.964134 2 25344 4.503276 2 31287
2008 3.99549 2 24835 4.597229 2 30747
2009 3.925772 2 23657 4.615966 2 29763
2010 4.068504 2 23371 4.789317 2 29224
2011 4.178347 2 23073 4.917405 2 28888
2012 4.275069 2 23056 5.068416 3 28575
Total 3.933042 2 256862 4.534004 2 310136
Source: Own calculation with data from NALMF and import transactions.
Lastly, I make a comparison between wholesalers and manufacturers along several dimen-
sions. In particular, I compute the average and median number of products imported by firm,
as well as the average and median number of countries from which these firms import goods
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from. The evolution of these variables over time is depicted in Table 4.1:
On average, manufacturing firms imported 22.3 different HS10 products, while whole-
salers carried 28.6 products. Over time, the average number of products imported by manufac-
turing firms mostly remained constant, while the number of products imported by wholesalers
increased from 24.7 in 2002 to nearly 31.8 in 2012. Additionally, wholesalers imported on av-
erage from 4.53 countries, a number that increased from 3.8 in 2002 to 5.0 in 2012. Similarly,
over the period of observation manufacturing firms imported from 3.9 countries on average.
In 2002, manufacturing firms imported from 3.4 countries and in 2012 from 4.2. Finally, the
number of importing firms experienced a more rapid increase in the wholesale trade sector
than in the manufacturing one. Between 2002 and 2012, the number of importing firms in the
manufacturing sector increased by 9%, while the number of importing firms in the wholesale
trade sector grew by 17%.
The empirical regularities presented in this subsection suggest that wholesalers have in-
creased their presence in the international markets. First, the share of total import value carried
by wholesalers increased from 26.5% in 2002, to 34.3% in 2012. Second, wholesalers were the
dominant players on the final goods import markets and earned notoriety in the import markets
of intermediate inputs. Finally, when compared to manufacturing firms, wholesalers imported
more goods and from more countries, and the number of firms engaging in international trade
grew more in the wholesale trade sector relative to the manufacturing sector.
4.3.3 Indirect Import Penetration
Following the literature on import competition, I construct measures of the exposure to
imports of intermediate and final goods carried by wholesalers. It differs from traditional mea-
sures of import competition in three ways: first, because it focuses on the indirect imports
carried by wholesalers, second because it considers the end use of the goods (intermediate or
final), and last because it is defined at the local market level. Let IIPeneit denote the indirect
import penetration of goods with end use e = {intermediate, final} in local market i in year t:
IIPeneit = 100×
Meit
Mit + S it
(4.1)
where Meit and Mit represent the value of the imports of goods with end use e and total import
value in local market i and year t, respectively, and S it is the value of the total manufacturing
sales in local market i and year t. With respect to this measure of indirect import penetration
two precisions are noteworthy. First, the total import value only considers the imports from
firms in the wholesale trade and manufacturing sector. This is not an important issue, as these
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two sectors account for more than 75% of the total import value. And second, given data
limitations the denominator does not exclude the total export value and thus it is not equal to
the domestic absorption.
Additionally, I propose an alternative measure of import penetration that takes the form of
the average of the indirect import penetration in local markets located within a certain radius.
This measure is aimed to capture second-order effects of neighbouring locations around the
local-market of a firm. Let IIPeneit
r







| N ri |
(4.2)
where: N ri =
{
k ∈ I | dik ≤ r
}
where I is the total number of labor markets, dik is the distance in kilometres between local
market i and local market k and the set N ri contains the indices of all the local markets whose
distance to i is less than r kilometres. Similarly, looking forward the instrumental variable
specification used in this chapter, I define the average import penetration across labor markets
located outside an inner radius and within and outer radius. When computing the average,
this instrument excludes local market i and its immediate neighbours, and focuses instead on

















k ∈ I | r < dik ≤ r′
}
It is important to notice that in order to estimate the local effects of the indirect imports
exposure on firm-level outcomes, a definition of what is a local market is required. The em-
pirical literature has often used administrative regions (Gyourko and Tracy 1991, Topel 1986)
or combinations of administrative regions and industries (Glaeser et al. 1992) as local markets.
In this chapter, I follow the second approach and define local markets as the pair of the 3-digit
NAICS industries and the economic region (ECR) as defined by Statistics Canada. This defi-
nition is aimed to measure competition at a fine level, and assumes that firms within the same
industry and geographic location are subject to the same shocks and only react to the imported
goods that are directed to their industry of affiliation and economic region.
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4.3.4 Manufacturing Firms’ Variables
All the data regarding firm performance is obtained from the NALMF. Given that this
extensive dataset is mostly derived from the T2 Corporate Income Tax Return files, and by law
all corporations have to file a tax return every year, it is possible to construct a panel containing
information on revenues, expenses, assets, the economic region, and industry of all the firms
in Canada, in particular the firms that belong to the manufacturing sector.
The sales of the firms are measured by the total sales of goods and services and the produc-
tion costs are computed as the sum of all the cost of sales, both of these variables are obtained
from the T2 Income Statement. Capital is measured as the book value of all the tangible capital
assets owned by the firms, and this information comes from the T2 Balance Sheet Information.
Additional information on employment and payroll is derived from the T4 Statements of Re-
muneration Paid. In particular, the measure of employment corresponds to the sum of all the
Individual Labor Units (ILU), where an ILU is a submitted T4 with a valid Social Insurance
Number (SIN). The total payroll is given by the sum of all the wages and salaries from sub-
mitted T4s with valid SINs. The direct wages are measured as the sum of commissions, labor
costs, production wages and supervision and are aimed to measured the fraction of the total
payroll that constitutes labor costs associated with production. Most of these variables are
measured in Canadian dollars, whenever real variables are required I deflate them using the
appropriate industry-specific price indices from the KLEMS database. All the firms located in
the same economic region are assigned the same geographic coordinates which correspond to
the centroid of the economic region area.
Since one of the outcomes of interest is productivity, a firm-level measure of total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) is computed as the residual of a three-input Cobb Douglas production
function, which is estimated by means of ordinary least squares (OLS):
lnQ jt = α0 +αKlnK jt +αLlnL jt +αMlnM jt + ε jt (4.4)
where j refers to the manufacturing firm and t the year. The variable Q corresponds to the sales
deflated by the gross output industry-specific price index, K is the book value of the tangible
assets by the industry-specific price index for capital, L is the number of individual labor units
and M is a measure of intermediate inputs which is constructed as in Leung et al. (2008) (sales
- payroll - gross profits) that is deflated by the intermediate inputs price index from KLEMS.10
Moreover, following Bernard et al. 2006 I construct two measures of input intensity at the
firm level. The first one, denoted as capital intensity, is computed as the logarithm of the ratio
10The results from the firm-level TFP estimation are available upon request.
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of the real value of capital, to the real value of the total payroll. The second, denoted as skill
intensity, is computed as the ratio of the wages paid to production workers (direct wages) to
the total payroll. Both variables are included as controls of firm characteristics.
Finally, since I am interested on the firm-level response through the extensive margin I
have to determine when a firm has exited the market. To do that, I exploit the successor-
predecessor table that comes with the NALMF to take into account when firms merge, are
absorbed or incorporate new firms. Intuitively, in the NALMF when a firm is observed in
period t but not in a subsequent period t + p it could be due to two reasons: 1) the firm indeed
exited the market and stopped producing; or 2) the firm was absorbed by or merged with
another firm, and now it has a new firm identifier. To help build intuition consider this simple
example. Suppose firm a exists in period 1. Then in period 2, this firm merges with firm b, and
together they form a new firm called c. In period 2, firms a and b will cease to exist, however
is incorrect to assume that firm a exited the market in period 2 as it only became a bigger firm
and changed its name. In the successor-predecessor table I would observe a link indicating
that a is the predecessor of c. Thus for those firms that no longer appear in the sample and are
not predecessors of any firm, we can safely assume that they exited the market. To restrict my
attention to firms that actually exited the market, I construct an exit indicator variable Xt:t+p
that takes a value of 1 if the firm was active in period t, no longer appears in the sample after p
years (where of course t + p ≤ 2012), and at the same time this firm is not predecessor of any
other firm(s), and 0 otherwise.
4.4 Empirical Results
The next step, is to empirically estimate the effect of higher exposure to imports of whole-
salers along different margins of adjustment of manufacturing enterprises. Initially, I study
how manufacturing firms respond to higher import competition in their local markets by ad-
justing their intensive margin. My definition of what constitutes a local market, is given by the
combination of the 3-digit manufacturing industry and economic region. That is, it is assumed
that manufacturing firms will only react to the imports made by wholesalers that are targeted to
their own 3-digit industry and economic region. As dependant variables, I focus on the annual
grow of firm-level employment, real sales and productivity, and estimate a similar specification
as the one in Bernard et al. 2006:
∆lny ji,t+1 = α+βI IIPenInti,t−1 +β
F IIPenFini,t +δZ ji,t−1 + ε jit (4.5)
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where ∆lny ji,t+1 ≡ 100×
(
lny jit+1− lny jit
)
is the growth rate of the outcome of interest of
firm j located in local market i in year t +1. The outcome y is either the real sales, employment
or TFP of manufacturing firms. The variables IIPenInti,t−1 and IIPen
Fin
i,t−1, correspond to the
indirect import penetration of intermediate and final goods, respectively, at the local market
i in period t − 1, and are constructed either by only considering the import values and sales
of firms located in the local market i as in equation (4.1), or as the average of the indirect
import penetration in the local markets located within a 100 km radius around local market
i, as described by equation (4.2). Vector Z ji,t−1 contains a a set of lagged controls of the
characteristics of the manufacturing firms, which include the capital intensity, skill intensity
and the age.
The choice of a 100 km radius is reasonable mainly for two reasons. First, because that
radius includes more than 30% of the total number of bilateral distances across Canadian firms
in 2002.11 Second, because is well known that wholesalers also control vast distribution net-
works and they mostly specialize in local availability. That is, wholesalers choose strategically
their location in order maximize their market reach and at the same time minimize distribution
costs. In this regard, empirical evidence supports the idea that wholesalers predominantly ship
to nearby destinations. For instance, Ganapati (2017) reports that 54%, 67% and 75% of the
total shipments made by US wholesalers where to the same State, Census Region and Census
Division of the US, respectively. Finally, another important consideration is that the NALMF
contains information at the firm-level, and thus it may neglect that some of the wholesalers and
manufacturing firms could be associated with multiple plant locations. However, this might
not be an important issue in this dataset because, as reported by Statistics Canada, almost
97% of the registered businesses were single unit firms. Regardless of that, measuring import
penetration as the average of neighbouring locations could help to alleviate that concern.
11See the histogram of bilateral distances across firms depicted in Figure C.1 the Appendix C.
70 Chapter 4. ImportWholesalers and the Effect of Trade on Canadian Producers
Table 4.2: Firm Outcomes and Indirect Import Penetration
Labor Labor Sales Sales TFP TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IIPenInti,t−1 0.119*** 0.074** 0.008
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)










Age -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.025 -0.025 -0.038*** -0.038***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Capital intensity 0.458*** 0.436*** -0.094 -0.119 0.295*** 0.295***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04)
Skill intensity 0.265*** 0.270*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.077* -0.076*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
N 225,797 225,797 231,339 231,339 199,020 199,020
Note: Estimated using fixed effects at the Year + ECR level. Clustered standard errors at the ECR-level are
included in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.2 summarizes the relationship between the firm employment, sales and TFP an-
nual growth and the local market exposure to imports of intermediate and final goods made by
wholesalers, when the local markets are defined a the industry-ECR level. In all the specifica-
tions, I include fixed effects at the year level and also at the ECR level to control for aggregate
variation in the firm outcomes and unobservable characteristics at the ECR that could be af-
fecting the outcomes of interest. The standard errors reported are clustered at the ECR level.
The results reveal that the local market indirect import penetration of intermediate goods is
positively and significantly correlated with the average manufacturing firm growth of employ-
ment and real sales. At the same time, the local market indirect import penetration of final
goods is negatively and significantly correlated with the same two variables. The results are
maintained regardless of which measure of local market exposure to indirect imports is used.
According to the estimations depicted in columns (1) and (3), a 10% indirect import penetra-
tion of intermediate goods in a local market, is associated with a 1.19% and a 0.74% increase
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on average manufacturing firm growth of employment and sales, respectively. While, a 10%
indirect import penetration of final goods in a local market, is associated with a 0.72% and a
1.50% decrease on average manufacturing firm growth of employment and sales. The results
depicted in columns (2) and (4), which correspond to the case in which the import penetration
variables are constructed as the average across nearby locations, yield very similar coefficients.
As described in columns (4) and (5), no statistical relation is observed between the indirect
import penetration variables and the growth of the total factor productivity of manufacturing
firms.
Additionally, I examine the response of manufacturing firms to intermediated interna-
tional trade through the extensive margin. In particular, I study how a higher exposure to the
imports of final and intermediate goods carried by wholesalers correlates with the exit rates of
domestic manufacturing firms over different time horizons. For that purpose, I estimate a linear
probability model described by:
Xt:t+pi j = α+β
I IIPenInti,t−1 +β
F IIPenFini,t−1 +δZ ji,t−1 + ε jit (4.6)
where p = 1,2, ..,5 years. Recall that the variable of interest, is an exit indicator, Xt:t+p, that
takes a value of 1 if the firm is active in period t and exited the market after p years, and 0
otherwise. As described before, to properly identify exit I require firms to not be predecessors
of any other firms. These regressions employ the same firm characteristics and fixed effects as
the previous specification. Table 4.3 reports the relationship between the probability of firm
exit and the average local market exposure to indirect imports of intermediate and final goods
for different time horizons.
At the top panel, the results where the import penetration variables are constructed at
the industry-ECR level are depicted. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on
IIPenInt indicates that the probability of exit decreases with the local market exposure to im-
ports of intermediate goods from wholesalers. Moreover, this negative relationship strengthens
as the interval increases, on average a 10% indirect import penetration of intermediate goods
reduces the probabilities of exiting after one, two, three, four and five years in -2.1%, -5.2%,
-8.5%, -13.3% and -18.8%, respectively. As expected, the positive coefficient on IIPenFin
shows a positive relationship between exit rates and exposure to indirect imports of final goods.
The estimated coefficients imply that a 10% indirect import penetration of final goods increases
the probabilities of exiting after one, two, three, four and five years in 3.7%, 8.2%, 14%, 18.9%
and 23.5%, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Exit rates and Indirect Import Penetration
Pr(Xt:t+1) Pr(Xt:t+2) Pr(Xt:t+3) Pr(Xt:t+4) Pr(Xt:t+5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IIPenInti,t−1 -0.021** -0.052*** -0.085*** -0.133*** -0.181***
(-0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
IIPenFini,t−1 0.037*** 0.082*** 0.140*** 0.189*** 0.235***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Age -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital intensity -0.002*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Skill intensity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 231,393 205,828 179,754 153,439 126,789
IIPenInti,t−1
100 km
-0.016* -0.045*** -0.073*** -0.112*** -0.151***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
IIPenFini,t−1
100 km
0.044*** 0.104*** 0.177*** 0.244*** 0.309***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital intensity -0.002*** -0.001* -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Skill intensity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 231,393 205,828 179,754 153,439 126,789
Note: Estimated using fixed effects at the Year + ECR level. Clustered standard errors at
the ECR-level are included in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The bottom panel of Table 4.3 depicts the results where the indirect import penetration
variables are computed as the average of neighbouring local markets. Similar patterns are ob-
served and the statistical significance of all the coefficients of interest is preserved. Specifically,
I observe a negative correlation between the exposure to indirect imports of intermediate goods
and exit probabilities and a positive relationship between the exposure to indirect imports of
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final goods and exit probabilities over different time intervals. The estimated coefficients on
IIPenInt range from −.016 for the probability of exiting after 1 year, to −.151 for the probabil-
ity of exiting after 5 years. While the estimated coefficients on IIPenFin range from .044 for
the probability of exiting after 1 year, to .309 for the probability of exiting after 5 years.
In summary, when the local markets are defined as the combination of the 3-digit NAICS
industry and economic region I observe a robust positive coefficient of the exposure to indi-
rect imports of intermediate goods on the manufacturing firms’ annual growth of employment
and real sales, and a negative correlation with firm exit probabilities after one to five years.
Similarly, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation of the exposure to indirect
imports of final goods on the growth of employment and sales, and a positive correlation with
exit probabilities of manufacturing firms. These results are robust to the different measures
of indirect import penetration either computed using imports and domestic sales at the local
market, or computed as the average of the import penetration variables of local markets located
within a 100 km radius. No statistically significant relation is observed between the import
penetration in intermediate and final goods and the annual growth of the TFP of manufacturing
firms.
4.4.1 Endogeneity
One of the major concerns of the estimated results is that both import penetration variables
IIPenInt and IIPenFin may suffer from endogeneity. Although it is reasonable to assume that
the lagged indirect import penetration variables are taken as given at the time manufacturing
firms solve their optimization processes, it may also be true that there could be omitted vari-
ables jointly affecting the indirect import penetration and the outcomes of manufacturing firms.
To see that, consider the effect of policies aiming to boost employment and economic activity
at the local market level. When provincial governments and municipalities provide incentives
and tax stimulus aimed to retain and attract new firms, the location-specific component of these
policies would naturally influence the output and input markets faced by domestic producers,
and at the same time would have an effect on the location decisions of manufacturing firms
and wholesalers. As a consequence, the degree of import exposure and the level of economic
activity within a local market could be largely determined by a combination of underlying local
conditions and shocks that are not always observable.
Usually, the literature has addressed the endogeneity in the import penetration variables
using an aggregate approach. For instance, Bernard et al. (2006) and Kamal and Lovely
(2017) instrument the industry-level import penetration with industry-year ad-valorem tariffs
and freight rates, and exchange rate fluctuations. The validity of these type of instruments re-
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lies on the fact that movements in exchange rates and trade costs are mostly driven by global
macroeconomic factors, but are expected to have a strong correlation with the industry im-
port shares.12 Alternatively, there is an extensive literature studying the effects of the surge of
Chinese import competition on the US labor market, such as David et al. (2013), Autor et al.
(2014), Acemoglu et al. (2016), and more recently Caliendo et al. (2019). These papers have
aimed to identify the supply-driven component of Chinese imports by instrumenting the growth
of US imports from China with the Chinese import growth of other high-income markets. The
underlying assumption of this approach is that the import demand shocks in these high-income
countries are not the main driver of China’s substantial export increase, and instead this is
the result of internal conditions and global changes in the trade policies toward that coun-
try.13 Specifically, this approach computes measures of import penetration using industry-level
growth of Chinese exports to other high-income countries other than the US, to instrument for
the US industry-level import exposure variables.
Given that my interest is to estimate the local effects of higher indirect import exposure
on the outcomes of manufacturing firms, the aggregate approach used in the literature is not
suitable for my purpose. Instead, I propose a different approach in which I exploit the fact that
I can observe the location of the importing wholesalers and their influence zones. In particular,
I instrument the indirect import penetration in a given local market with the average of the
indirect import penetration in the local markets located outside an inner radius but within an
outer radius. The plausibility of these instruments, relies on the assumption that the radius of
influence of local market conditions is smaller than the market reach of wholesalers. Thus by
focusing on the average outside this radius, I would be able to exclude all the variation that
depends on local government policies and local market shocks, and instead use the variation
associated with being exposed to the goods imported by wholesalers.14
12In fact, Kamal and Lovely 2017 report that when using US firm-level data the power of these instruments is
weak.
13For instance, in 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and benefited from lower tariffs
from other member countries.
14To see that, consider a manufacturing firm located in London Ontario, this firm might not have the same
regulations nor face the same local market conditions of firms located in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), however
it may easily have access to (or be competing with) the intermediate and final goods imported by wholesalers
located in the GTA.
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Table 4.4: Firm Outcomes and Indirect Import Penetration, IV
Labor Labor: Int Labor: Fin Sales Sales: Int Sales: Fin TFP TFP: Int TFP: Fin
2S 1S 1S 2S 1S 1S 1S 1S 1S











0.546*** -0.196*** 0.549*** -0.196*** 0.545*** -0.194***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
IImpFini,t−1
100, 500 km
-0.117*** 1.078*** -0.116*** 1.081*** -0.118*** 1.078***
(0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.13)
Age -0.094*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.027 0.001 -0.007* -0.037*** 0.001 -0.004
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital intensity 0.450*** -0.069* -0.228** -0.107 -0.065* -0.198** 0.302*** -0.083** -0.227**
(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.14) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Skill intensity 0.275*** -0.018** 0.043* -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.078* -0.016** 0.043*
(0.10) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
N 224,735 224,735 224,735 230,286 230,286 230,286 198,117 198,117 198,117
Min. Eigenvalue 27097.0 27671.6 23982.8
Note: Estimated using fixed effects at the Year + ECR level. Clustered standard errors at the ECR-level are included in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
I estimate specification (4.5) by means of two-stage least squares. Columns (1), (4) and
(7) of Table 4.4 report the IV estimates. These estimates confirm that the firm growth of
employment and real sales remains positively correlated to the indirect import penetration of
intermediate goods in its local market. At the same time, firm growth of employment and
sales is negatively correlated to the indirect import penetration of final goods. As before, no
statistical relation is observed between import penetration variables and the annual growth of
the TFP. Overall, the magnitude of the IV estimates is larger than the one reported in Table
4.2. I formally assess whether the instruments proposed are relevant. In Table 4.4, I depict
the first-stage regressions, and as can be noted the instruments are strongly correlated with the
endogenous variables and are statistically significant. Moreover, at the bottom of the table I
report the minimum eigenvalue statistic developed by Cragg and Donald (1993). This statistic
constitutes a generalization (for multiple endogenous variables) of the first-stage F-statistics
used to detect weak instruments with one endogenous variable, in which the null hypothesis is
that the coefficients on the instruments on the first stage are jointly zero. Notice that in all cases,
the value of the statistic is extremely large and is well beyond the critical values proposed by
Stock and Yogo (2005).15 Therefore, it can be concluded that there are no problems of having
15The critical values proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) assume that the errors are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) normal, which may not be appropriate for my application that uses cluster-robust standard
errors.
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weak instruments.
Additionally, I report the 95% confidence ellipsoids for the coefficients on the indirect
import penetration of intermediate and final goods using the procedure described in Cher-
nozhukov and Hansen (2008). Two of the main advantages of this procedure, is that is not only
robust to the presence of weak instruments, but is also robust to heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation through the use of conventional cluster-robust covariance matrix estimators. To serve
as a comparison, I also report the 95% confidence region of the parameters of interest using a
procedure that is not robust to the presence of weak instruments but that takes into account the
covariance across coefficients. As can be seen in Figure 4.3, in the employment and sales spec-
ifications the 95% confidence regions for the weak instrument robust (WIR) procedure exclude
the zero effect on both coefficients and and are located in the lower right quadrant, meaning
that the coefficient on final goods has a negative sign and the one of intermediate goods has
a positive sign. Notice that although there is extensive overlap with the confidence regions
obtained by means of the non-WIR procedure, there are some differences at the borders. Con-
sistent with previous results, the confidence region for the TFP specification is located near the
origin and include the zero effect on both coefficients.
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Finally, Table 4.5 contains the instrumental variable analogues of the linear probability
specifications described by equation (4.6). The estimates confirm the positive effect of the in-
direct import penetration of final goods on the exit probabilities of manufacturing firms after
one to five years. Again the magnitude of the coefficients is larger relative to the OLS esti-
mates. Moreover, even when the coefficients on the indirect import penetration in intermediate
goods are negative, these coefficients are close to zero and none of them are statistically signif-
icant. Thus, there is no clear evidence of a causal effect of the exposure to indirect imports of
intermediate goods on the survival of manufacturing firms.
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Table 4.5: Exit rates and Indirect Import Penetration, IV
Pr(Xt:t+1) Pr(Xt:t+2) Pr(Xt:t+3) Pr(Xt:t+4) Pr(Xt:t+5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IImpInti,t−1
100 km
-0.024 -0.045 -0.073 -0.090 -0.132
(0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
IImpFini,t−1
100 km
0.047*** 0.126*** 0.228*** 0.333*** 0.430***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital intensity -0.002*** -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Skill intensity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 230,286 204,821 178,851 152,652 126,169
Min. Eigenvalue 27767.3 24536.0 21494.6 18766.2 14968.7
Note: Estimated using fixed effects at the Year + ECR level. Clustered standard errors at
the ECR-level are included in parenthesis.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.5 Conclusion
Using a unique administrative dataset for Canadian firms that combines detailed informa-
tion on performance with import transactions, I explore the presence of wholesalers in interna-
tional trade. With this dataset, I document a series of empirical regularities highlighting their
role as trade intermediaries and distributors of imported final and intermediate goods. First, I
find that the share of total import value accounted by wholesalers increased from from 26.5%
in 2002, to 34.3% in 2012. Second, I document that wholesalers were the dominant players
on the final goods import markets, accounting for almost 50% of the total import value of final
goods in 2012, up from 43% in 2002. Similarly, they earned notoriety in the import markets
of intermediate inputs by increasing their import share from 16% to almost 22% ten years
later. Additionally, I find substantial differences on how wholesalers and manufacturing firms
engage in international trade. Specifically, I document that when compared to manufacturing
firms, wholesalers imported more goods and from more countries, and over the observation
period the number of importing firms grew more in the wholesale trade sector relative to the
manufacturing sector.
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Given that the NALMF dataset allows me to observe the location of all the firms in Canada,
I construct local market measures of the exposure to the imports of final and intermediate
goods carried by wholesalers. Then, by exploiting the geographic variation in the exposure to
these indirect imports, I empirically estimate their effect on sales, employment, productivity
and exit rates of domestic manufacturing firms. The results suggest that there is a positive
and statistically significant correlation between indirect imports of intermediate goods and the
average firm growth of employment and sales, and a negative effect on the exit probabilities of
manufacturing firms after different time intervals. Moreover, I find a negative and statistically
significant correlation between indirect imports of intermediate goods and the average firm
growth of employment and sales, and a positive effect on the exit probabilities of manufacturing
firms after different time intervals. These correlations are robust to the measure of indirect
import penetration that only considers information for each local market, or that is computed
as the simple average of the indirect import penetration variables in neighbouring local markets
located around a 100 km radius.
Finally, I use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of the indi-
rect import penetration in intermediate and final goods on manufacturing firm outcomes and
exit probabilities. In particular, I employ a set instruments constructed as average of the indi-
rect import penetration in the local markets located within a 100 km and 500 km around each
local market. The plausibility of these instruments, relies on the assumption that the radius
of influence of local market conditions is smaller than the market reach of wholesalers. Thus
by focusing on the average outside an inner radius, these instruments remove all the variation
associated with local market conditions and local policies, but maintain the variation attributed
to the effects of being exposed to the imports of final and intermediate goods carried by whole-
salers. The instrumental variable estimates confirm the negative effect of indirect imports of
final goods on employment, sales and survival, as well as the positive effect of indirect imports
of intermediate goods on employments and sales. However, no causal effect of indirect imports
of intermediate goods on the exit probabilities of manufacturing firms is observed.
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For a firm with n and n + 1 (notice the subscript is omitted for simplicity) years of tenure
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In addition to the specifications included in the main text. Here, I present the results
when the partial-year bias is not taken into account. That is, the monthly sales an prices are
annualized as the sum or average over the calendar year. The results and the significance of the
coefficients remain mostly unaltered.
Table B1: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3)
Cont. rates Export sales Export prices
Constant 0.384∗∗∗ 2.442∗∗∗ -2.948∗∗∗
(0.00157) (0.00669) (0.00396)
Age = 2 0.142∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.00305) (0.0148) (0.00755)
Age = 3 0.218∗∗∗ 1.369∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.00376) (0.0191) (0.00910)
Age = 4 0.251∗∗∗ 1.726∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.00451) (0.0237) (0.0106)
Age = 5 0.275∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.00511) (0.0290) (0.0123)
Age = 6 0.293∗∗∗ 2.353∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.00598) (0.0363) (0.0150)
Age = 7 0.291∗∗∗ 2.618∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.00671) (0.0434) (0.0168)
Age = 8 0.281∗∗∗ 2.987∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.00807) (0.0562) (0.0214)
Age = 9 3.316∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.0304)
Observations 228,693 230,512 230,511
Notes: All regressions include firm-product-year plus
country-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
the firm-year.




When the exit value is normalized to zero, the exporters problem can be expressed as
dynamic control problem which has been extensively studied by Pakes et al. (1991) and more























pt : −(σ−1) · ct +σ
mct
pt
− (σ−1)λtδ · ct = 0 (B.1)


































































Finally, by combining equations B.2, B.3 and B.4 and taking expectations, the equation















Table C1: Import Shares by Sector
Year Manufacturing Wholesale Trade
Sector share Firm share Sector share Firm share
2002 60.403 5.306 26.552 15.660
2003 59.538 4.895 26.889 15.125
2004 57.445 5.010 28.509 15.290
2005 56.162 5.051 29.332 15.728
2006 52.474 5.050 32.567 15.470
2007 49.826 5.081 31.973 15.388
2008 47.451 5.197 31.379 15.663
2009 41.048 4.928 34.217 15.115
2010 40.297 4.998 34.573 15.128
2011 39.121 4.938 32.963 15.443
2012 38.564 5.013 34.308 15.610
Source: Own calculation with data from Statistics Canada.
Table C2: Import Shares by Sector and End-Use
Year Manufacturing Wholesale Trade
Intermediate Final Intermediate Final
2002 75.203 33.188 16.479 43.106
2003 74.544 31.732 16.351 42.933
2004 72.199 29.993 17.963 44.455
2005 71.461 29.172 18.687 45.701
2006 68.700 25.950 21.300 48.113
2007 65.087 25.166 20.630 47.576
2008 62.006 24.422 20.339 46.684
2009 54.007 22.324 22.581 47.955
2010 51.566 21.372 24.584 47.574
2011 50.747 19.804 21.636 49.477
2012 50.712 19.738 21.742 49.175
Source: Own calculation with data from Statistics Canada.
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Figure C.1: Histogram of Bilateral Distances















Source: Own calculation with data from DMTI Spatial.
Inference with Weak Instruments
To further assess the validity of the proposed instruments, I compute the 95% confi-
dence ellipsoids of the two endogenous variables based on the approach implemented by Cher-
nozhukov and Hansen (2008). A key advantage of this approach is that it allows to do inference
on structural parameters even in the presence of weak instruments. In what follows, I briefly
describe the testing procedure. Suppose that we are interested in the structural parameters of
the simultaneous regression framework described by:
Y = Xβ+ WΠ+ ε (C.1)
X = Zθ+ Wγ+ ν (C.2)
where Y is a T ×1 vector of outcomes variable X is a T ×S matrix of endogenous regres-
sors, W is a T ×K matrix of controls and Z is a T ×R matrix of excluded instruments where
R ≥ S . Now suppose we want to test the hypothesis β = β0, notice that if we substitute (8) in
(7) under the null hypothesis we have:
Y −Xβ0 = Zα+ Wδ+ ε (C.3)
therefore testing α = 0 is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis β = β0, and this test is robust
to the presence of weak instruments. In particular, the Wald statistic WS (β0) can be constructed
as a robust statistic for testing β = β0, and this statistic will be asymptotically distributed as a
χ2R with R degrees of freedom. The steps for constructing the 95% confidence ellipsoid for the
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Weak Instrument Robust procedure are:
1. Construct a grid B containing possible values of β. In my application, I construct a
30×30 grid including 5 standard deviations around the 2SLS coefficient β̂.
2. For each b ∈ B, define Ỹ = Y − Xb and regress Ỹ on Z and W. Obtain α̂ and the corre-
sponding cluster-robust variance-covariance submatrix V̂ (α̂).
3. Construct the Wald statistic W(b) = α̂′V̂ (α̂)−1 α̂.
4. Construct the 1− p level confidence region as the set of b such that WS (b) ≤C1−p where
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